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The failure of communications, particularly related to interoperability, between police 
and firefighters responding to dangerous situations has resulted in death or injury to 
themselves or those they strive to protect. Using Grebner’s and Shannon and Weaver’s 
conceptualizations of communications theory as the foundation, the purpose of this 
general qualitative study was to evaluate, from the perspective of first responders, what 
barriers exist that may impede opportunities for interoperability of communications 
systems. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with a purposive sample 
of 18 experienced first responders from the states of California, New York, and Texas.  
Interview data were deductively coded and subjected to a thematic analysis procedure.  
Key findings indicated that participants perceived differences in technology among 
agencies as a primary source of frustration and impediment to full interoperability.  
Further, participants identified policy barriers, a lack of inter-agency training 
opportunities, and budgetary constraints as frustrating the efforts toward interoperability. 
The positive social change implications of this study include recommendations to policy 
makers and first responder agency leadership to support policy change, including 
appropriations, that encourage increased interoperability among first responder agencies 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Somewhere in the United States, a catastrophe is beginning, a conflagration or 
some other disaster is about to take place, or an accident is about to occur that will 
require the efforts of emergency response personnel, both at the scene and in back-up 
support locations. Whether man-made or natural, emergency situations occur continually. 
At that point, the ability of emergency organizations and personnel to respond quickly 
and effectively to any such calamity should ultimately bring the emergency to a complete 
and successful close as quickly as possible. Still, not every emergency has a successful 
outcome. According to the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH), an average of 97 firefighters and 155 police officers died each year between 
1990 and 2001 ( [NIOSH], 2015) in responding to work-related duties. Bringing these 
statistics more current, roughly 100 firefighters and 85 law enforcement officers perish 
on the job annually (NIOSH, 2015).  
A direct example of these statistics was demonstrated in the fire storm that swept 
across the American Northwest during the summer of 2015. The National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA; 2015) reported that wildfires are growing in intensity 
throughout the West. At the time, there were almost 30 active fires in Washington State 
alone. In this situation, the emergency responders were not adequately prepared or 
properly equipped to confront the challenges faced. The principal challenges included 
both the lack of radio interoperability and a lack of training with the equipment (NASA, 
2015). While this particular condition concerns the equipment, the depth of the issue is 
further aligned with internal factors such as policy, training, and budget concerns. 
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The largest fire that was still active as of August 26, 2015 was the Okanogan 
Complex Fire that not only had destroyed 256,567 acres of land but also had 1,250 
people trying to get it under control (NASA, 2015). It started from a strike of lightning 
and had only been 10% contained 11 days later. The federal government rapidly got 
emergency funding and other resources to Washington; however, the state topped the 
casualty list for the summer wildfires with three deaths on August 19 in the Okanogan 
Complex Fire (NASA, 2015). 
In the case of strike teams whose members come from outside the local area to 
respond to a disaster, as was true in the aforementioned wildfire across the Northwest, a 
team works off one radio frequency that is usually not compatible with that of other 
teams. One or two members of the team are assigned to area responsibility and for 
checking in at the command post where the responsible party might have been issued a 
radio. Problems arise for numerous reasons: sometimes the number of the command post 
is not known, other times there could also be environmental considerations that affect the 
ability to communicate including dense tree cover; whether it is day or night; weather 
conditions; radio waves reacting differently depending on land, sea, or mountain 
topography; smoke conditions; and the ability of the communication equipment itself to 
receive signals (Nowell & Steelman, 2015). All these obstacles affect the ability to 
communicate over a network.  
There is no liaison or policy in place with how the communication will flow via 
radio frequency or a plan of checking in, for instance, or get on a certain channel unless it 
is predesignated. When agencies bring in so many resources hastily or the preparation is 
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not worked out in briefings or memoranda of understanding or agreement 
(MOUs/MOAs), communication missteps occur. If agencies cannot coordinate their 
efforts due to lack of communication, the consequences can be life threatening (e.g., in 
the case of the northwest wildfire, first responders did not even know the fire was headed 
toward them. They did not know the wind had shifted because they were not familiar 
with the lay of the land (Nowell & Steelman, 2015). 
In the case reported, as in many others, the responders were not adequately or 
properly equipped to confront the challenges with which they were faced (Nowell & 
Steelman, 2015). The principal challenges most often include the lack of radio 
interoperability and other forms of communication. Such a situation is common as a 
consequence of the lack of essential and regularly-updated training programs, inadequate 
and improperly allocated budgets, and ineffectual or misapplied governing policies 
(Timmons, 2007). 
The topic of the present study is communication during a crisis, an especially 
important issue for first responders to disasters including wild fires, terrorism, and acts of 
nature where significant numbers of people are involved. From the perspective of public 
policy makers, the three most important elements of such communications 
interoperability are adequate resources (budget), up-to-date and functional equipment and 
how to use it (training), and policies to expand radio interoperability and communication 
among first responders (policy). Although radio interoperability specifically and 
communication in general are paramount in emergency management, few scholarly 
studies have been conducted in this area. Understanding the implications of the lack of 
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communication interoperability and its connection to budget, training, and policy has 
important social ramifications in emergency management. In this chapter, I give 
background for the development of communications interoperability and present the 
conceptual framework of communication theory of the study as well as the research 
questions, operational definitions, and qualitative methods.  
Background of the Study 
Clear, uninterrupted communication is essential in the field of emergency 
management where firefighters and law enforcement rely heavily on radio 
interoperability. When multiple agencies are involved in a major event like a wildfire, 
frequently, emergency personnel cannot communicate with one other (Barthel, 2012). At 
best, they can do so on a very limited basis, for the bandwidth is too small. Consequently, 
firefighters and law enforcement personnel who work the same incident often resort to 
using personal cell phones and social media as a fast and reliable way to communicate 
the events, the course of action, and the outcome of the situation (Brengarth & Mujkic, 
2016; Tuite, 2012).  
Different organizations have different means of communication. These agencies 
can be paid or volunteer fire departments or law enforcement entities including urban 
police departments; sheriff departments; regional FBI; and federal agencies at the federal, 
state, county, and local town or city level among others (Kehl et al., 2014). Regarding 
budget and policy issues, larger organizations have more funding compared to smaller 
agencies and a variety of policies (Kehl et al., 2014). These variations depend on budget 
and training of persons within a particular agency. Additionally, each organization has 
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different policies regarding the use of the equipment for radio interoperability and might 
have MOUs) and MOAs between two organizations to (a) work off same channel and (b) 
follow procedures if an incident happens when calling in mutual aid (Timmons, 2007). 
Resource allocation policies are regulated by budget or sometimes military standards 
related to weather conditions (NASA, 2015). Often mutual aid does not work. Even if on 
different frequencies, responders can patch/manipulate frequencies but problems arise if 
they do not support large-scale incidents like the floods in New Orleans (Davis & 
Robbin, 2015). These differences create the issues of lack of consistency and 
interoperability. While there is a particular channel within the radio system that allows 
firefighters and law enforcement personnel to interact simultaneously, this system is not 
always reliable when the integrity of the bandwidth becomes compromised (Timmons, 
2007). 
Moreover, one-on-one communication can occur through one person being 
patched to another person’s radio. This is effective for  updates, procedures, and course 
of actions, but this approach is not effective, for the communication is limited and then 
must be communicated with others, which costs time and potentially the lives of the first 
responders and those they are trying to save (Barthel, 2012). Compounding these 
problems are the elements of training and budget. Specifically, different municipalities 
have different allocations of budget for the actual equipment (Barthel, 2012). Another 
problem is that of firefighters and law enforcement personnel who need training on the 
actual equipment (Barthel, 2012). Because the actual equipment is different in each 
organization, the training is also different. Additionally, the training is not necessarily 
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standardized, so what and even who conducts or disseminates the information on the 
given equipment is not uniform. Public policies are needed to address the lack of 
communications interoperability because in these events, in essence, it is a matter of 
money and training versus saving lives. Although the literature on emergency 
management addresses communication issues in disasters (Brito, 2007; Hutchins & 
Timmons, 2007; Kawasaki, Berman, & Guan, 2013), no previous literature has been 
found on the lack of interoperability between firefighters and law enforcement personnel 
who resort to using personal (or work) cell phones as a way to mitigate a situation. 
There is a need to complete this study to increase the efficiency of communication 
between both the firefighters and those in law enforcement. This study also has the 
potential to result in policies that can save the lives of those who require assistance of 
firefighters and law enforcement personnel in a given situation. Furthermore, this study 
examines current practice that can lead to recommendations on how to better improve 
policy and practice within the discipline of emergency management. 
Problem Statement 
Lack of communication interoperability is becoming more significant in the field 
of emergency management. This field has grown exponentially due to natural disasters, 
acts of terrorism, and home-grown issues such as budget cuts, personnel reductions-in-
force, and increased technological needs in a given community. Consequently, seeking to 
ensure reliable communications interoperability in emergency management organizations 
such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) can pose multidimensional 
challenges for first responders in crises (FEMA, 2009; Minnis, 2013). Without effective, 
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reliable communication and its connection to public policy, the lives of first responders 
and those they rescue are placed in jeopardy. In challenging ineffective policies, thorough 
reviews of current standards, congressional law, situational investigations, executive 
orders, and committee reports have indicated inconsistencies in policy, training, and 
budget (Minnis, 2013).  
The gap in the literature is in scholarly studies on lack of communications 
interoperability during mass human crises and climate disasters including drought, 
flooding, wildfires, and winter storms (National Centers for Environmental Information, 
2016). Most reports originate from government sources and government agencies (e.g., 
the Centers for Disease Management and Control; CDC). Many peer-reviewed studies 
have been conducted regarding mass medical emergencies and event preparedness and 
recovery (e.g., Holmberg, 2014; Klappa, Audette, & Do, 2014; Yang, Xiao, Cheng, Zhu, 
& Arbon, 2010). This study addresses the substantive aspects of training, budget, and 
policy and how these three elements are inextricably linked to the provision of secure and 
reliable communication interoperability during grave emergencies. Perhaps a study such 
as this that investigates first responders’ experiences involving lack of communications 
interoperability and its connection to training, budget, and policy could help to mitigate 
life-threatening situations. 
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this basic qualitative study is to explore reliable means and 
measures to effectively ensure the safety of emergency responders through reliance on 
totally dependable radio communications (either directly or via a network), based on the 
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premise that reliable radio communications and fail-safe communications interoperability 
depend, in the context of this study, on three essential constituents: training, budget, and 
policy. For this study, I employed a qualitative research method. The data researchers 
derive who prefer a qualitative approach contain rich descriptions of social constructs as 
perceived by the participants (Wahyuni, 2012). In carrying out the research of this study, 
the effort entailed conducting interviews with law enforcement personnel and firefighters 
from the states of New York, Texas, and California. These individuals had been involved 
in emergency situations that had taken place in those states. Thus, I was able obtain first-
hand depictions of the kinds of adversities with which they were faced in addressing or 
surmounting a condition of failed communications interoperability in emergency 
situations. I also explored the role of policy, training, and budget in connection with 
communications interoperability. 
Research Questions 
 This study centered on and was guided by two essential questions: 
1. How do first responders describe their experiences in emergency situations 
that involve lack of communication interoperability? 
2. What is the role of budget and training in connection with communication 
interoperability and the policies that might be instituted to improve the safety 




The conceptual framework of my study is based on three theories: Grebner’s 
general model of communication theory; Shannon and Weaver’s information theory; and 
risk communication theory.  
Grebner’s Model of Communication Theory 
Grebner (1956) developed a communication theory model that emphasizes not 
only its dynamism but also how its reliability is affected by a variety of factors. To this 
end, communication is only dynamic and effective if there is a consistent method for how 
it is used. The factors in play in the perceptual dimension during an event (E) regarding 
the message (M) are selection, context, and availability (Grebner, 1956). In this 
dimension, where humans cannot perceive the entire event, they select what is needed or 
what interests them, leaving out the rest of the context of the event and the availability 
involves different cultural and personality factors (Grebner, 1956). In the means and 
controls dimension, humans now have to communicate with a third party and create 
context around the message to communicate in a variety of ways. They have varying 
degrees of control over the message at this point depending on their capabilities 
complicated by different receivers with many ways to perceive the message and interpret 
it (Grebner, 1956). The important concept is that at every level, communication can be 
changed or altered (Grebner, 1956).  
Shannon and Weaver’s Communication Theory 
Shannon initially began working on communication theory in the late 1940s to 
solve “the technical problems of high-fidelity transfer of sound” (Griffen, 2014, p. 48) 
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and collaborated later with Weaver, who was more interested in the interpretation of 
human communication to demonstrate that reducing loss of information regarding any 
communication issues solved the problem. Although the theory is based on the simple 
process of transferring messages from the one who encodes (i.e., the speaker) to one who 
receives (i.e. the listener), the strength of the message can be obscured through what is 
referred to in the theory as noise (Griffen, 2014). Noise can disrupt the flow of 
communication so that the receiver might not receive the intended message (Griffen, 
2014).  
Risk Communication Theory 
Finally, risk communication theory has some of its foundation in Fischhoff’s 
(1995) work regarding how managers should communicate a risk-like situation to the 
public. However, this definition has expanded over time and is now being applied to 
anyone in emergency management who becomes responsible for risk control. Risk 
communication has a tradition of focusing on information presentation, persuasion, and 
strategic messaging (Coombs, 2012). Additionally, failures at controlling or managing 
risk effectively can lead to a crisis, or a crisis may lead to the necessity for risk 
communication (Coombs, 2012). 
Application of Theories to Lack of Communication Interoperability 
All three theories are applicable to the conceptual framework of the present study, 
for it involves communications interoperability or its lack based on training, budget, and 
equipment stemming from public policies. First, communication is only dynamic and 
effective if there is a consistent method in how it is used. With this concept comes the 
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need for all law enforcement agencies and firefighting stations to have policies in place to 
facilitate channels within communication media for emergency personnel to be able to 
communicate with one another. Having the physical ability to communicate with other 
first responders is vital to mitigate an emergency situation. However, there are additional 
factors such as having the equipment but not knowing how to use it or human skill 
degrees in using the channels of communication (Grebner, 1956). These factors have a 
direct impact on first responders needing appropriate training. Further, the equipment and 
training may never even be issues to consider if adequate funding, proper budgetary 
items, are not initially allocated to provide first responders with the life-saving tools to 
complete a task.  
Second, regarding information theory in the present study (Griffen, 2014), the 
communication problem involves not being able to communicate, which may lead to loss 
of lives of both first responders and those of whom they are tasked to save. The factor of 
noise, in which the intended message is distorted or lost due to factors such as the 
disparate channels and protocols of communication among different teams, is significant 
in lack of communication interoperability (Griffen, 2014). Last, in lending itself 
specifically to first responders and their ability to manage the risks they encounter, risk 
communication theory is a solid part of the conceptual framework. The media of these 
first responders for successfully being able to resolve the risk are dependent on 
communication. The communication itself is dependent on several factors: having the 
budget to provide for the equipment, being able to support the responders in terms of 
training, and having equitable equipment and opportunity for all responders to 
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communicate on the same radio frequency (Griffen, 2014). Further elaboration on 
connections of the three theories in the conceptual framework can be found in Chapter 2. 
Nature of the Study 
In the context of this basic qualitative study, I conducted a series of 
semistructured interviews, using open-ended questions in the examination of particular 
events or occurrences to understand the attendant factors which may have had an 
influence on the experience of the interviewees. There were six participants from each 
state including one firefighter and one law enforcement official from an agency that 
serves a large population, one of each from a small agency such as a volunteer 
firefighting agency or law enforcement agency of fewer than 25 sworn personnel, and 
one of each from a rural agency with a large land base and small population (Oliver & 
Meier, 2016). Thus, there were a total of 18 participants. I sent a detailed letter to get 
approval from organizational leaders of several firefighting and law enforcement 
organizations to recruit participants who have experienced lack of communications 
interoperability.  
I selected the two different organizations simply because there is a high 
prevalence in both disciplines when it comes to lack of radio interoperability. Wildfires, 
for example, involve first responders from law enforcement as well as firefighting. It is 
also known that this issue has a trickle-down effect on other public safety disciplines such 
as EMS and emergency management to include public works and other public services 
that have numerous incidents of communication difficulty (Zane et al., 2012). The 
problem has also been seen in both organizations from the rural to the urban context via 
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policy issues, equipment disparities, and budget problems for getting better resources 
(Comfort, 2012). Both agencies work together as first responders in disaster scenarios. 
Yet, even autonomously, agencies have issues talking to each other and outside 
jurisdictions (Comfort, 2012). Personnel do not want to give up codes and all are 
encrypted, which is why they can no longer receive communications on scanners 
(Comfort, 2012). All these breakdowns in communication interoperability can result in 
serious consequences for first responders and those they are entrusted to serve. 
In finding the best method to conduct my study, I reviewed various 
methodological traditions. Wahyuni (2012) noted that quantitative research revolves 
around statistical data from an objective point of view. Quantitative researchers use 
instruments that are predetermined so that they can test hypotheses or seek correlations 
between variables, and in a mixed methods study both qualitative and quantitative data 
are used (Wahyuni, 2012). Because I did not plan to develop hypotheses or find 
relationships but rather explore and attempt to understand people’s experiences, neither 
quantitative nor mixed methodologies were appropriate.  
According to Yin (2014), qualitative research methodologies are used to collect 
rich experiential data through interviews, document review, and observations. Such data 
are not numeric but instead can be presented as narrative. Qualitative research is used to 
understand more deeply people’s social motivations. Its data result in word instead of 
numerical data (McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015). Additionally, it is used to explore 
people’s experiences in their natural settings at the same time the researcher strives to 
uphold ethical principles (Damianakis & Woodford, 2012). 
14 
 
Types of qualitative methodology include basic qualitative study, case study, 
phenomenology, ethnography, narrative inquiry, and grounded theory. The type of 
qualitative research I conducted was a basic qualitative study, which Merriam and Tisdell 
(2015) reported was conducted in studies resulting in peer-reviewed articles that 
researchers in many fields have presented. In the mental health field, for instance, 
Fernandez, Breen, and Simpson (2014) conducted basic qualitative research on women 
with bipolar disorders and ways in which their identity and loss had to be renegotiated (as 
cited in Merriam & Tisdell, 2015). The present study most lent itself to such a design to 
conduct a detailed exploration of the participants’ experiences regarding communications 
interoperability during crises. 
Phenomenology involves obtaining and understanding real experiences through 
which the participants lived, and the present study was derived solely through interviews 
through which rich, in-depth data were obtained (Denzin, 2012). Although I originally 
intended the study to be phenomenological, the data collected from 18 different 
participants, though abundant, did not necessarily go into such depth. Both grounded 
theory and narrative inquiry are used to develop “theories about psychological and social 
process” (Lal, Suto, & Ungar, 2012, p. 6). While my study on first responders’ 
experiences with lack of communications interoperability involved such processes, three 
communication theories, already developed and discussed, formed the framework of the 
study. No framework had to be developed in the study. A case study is used by 
researchers to explore events, bounded programs, or activities from the perspective of 
participants (Yin, 2014).  
15 
 
Participants in this study were interviewed individually on their first responder 
experiences at the height of responding to disasters and what led up to lack of 
communications interoperability rather than perspectives on such events in general. 
Finally, ethnographers tend to study people as groups in their natural backgrounds over 
long periods (Petty, Thomson, & Stew, 2012). They also observe organizational culture 
closely and how the participants function in that culture (Peterson & Sondergaard, 2011). 
Interviews lasted approximately 30 minutes to 1 hour; thus, they did not take place over 
prolonged periods and require embedded with the groups or observations. Therefore, 
ethnography would not have been an appropriate form of qualitative research for the 
study. 
Definitions 
The following terms are used in this paper or in documents referred to in this 
paper: 
Communications interoperability: In this context, the capability of a public safety 
agency to communicate by radio (either directly or via a network) with another public 
safety agency, on demand (planned and/or unplanned) and in real time (Hawkins, 2013). 
The radio link may be classified as either infrastructure independent or infrastructure 
dependent (Hawkins, 2013). 
Communications plan: Formal and agreed-upon strategies for communicating 
project status and activities to key stakeholders and methods for developing historical 
project records and archives (Hawkins, 2013). 
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Frequency bands: Frequency bands where land mobile radio systems operate in 
the United States, including the following: High HF (25-29.99 MHz), Low VHF (30-50 
MHz), High VHF (150-174 MHz), Low UHF (450-470 MHz), UHF TV Sharing (470-
512 MHz), 700 MHz (764-776/794-806 MHz), and 800 MHz (806-869 MHz) (National 
Task Force on Interoperability Guide, 2005). 
Incident Area Network (IAN): A basic communications networking type used to 
describe voice and/or data networks used by public safety agencies for emergency 
incidents or events (Hawkins, 2013). An IAN is a single network, or set of networks, 
providing communications for responders across the entire organization and geographic 
scope of an incident or event (Hawkins, 2013). 
Incident Command System (ICS): An organizational management system adapted 
from military techniques for public safety emergency response (National Task Force on 
Interoperability Guide, 2005). It provides common terminology, modular organizational 
structures, and objectives-based management principles among its basic principles.  
Infrastructure: When relating to radio communications systems, the hardware and 
software needed to complete and maintain the system (National Task Force on 
Interoperability Guide, 2005). 
Patch: A control center subsystem that permits a mobile or portable radio on one 
channel to communicate with one or more radios on a different channel through a control 
center console (National Task Force on Interoperability Guide, 2005). 
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Protocol: A set of unique rules specifying a sequence of actions necessary to 
perform a communications function (National Task Force on Interoperability Guide, 
2005). 
Shared channels: One of several means of achieving technical interoperability in 
which cooperating agencies designate specific, often dedicated, radio channels for 
interagency use (Department of Homeland Security; DHS, 2008). Most public safety 
radio bands have designated shared frequencies that are often used, though the term 
applies generally to any channels adopted for interagency communications (DHS, 2008).  
Shared system: A communications system developed by two or more different 
entities (e.g., local and state law enforcement agencies) to share the effort of system 
development, maintenance, and operations. Benefits of shared systems include lower 
costs, widespread interoperability, community interaction, and shared management and 
control (National Task Force on Interoperability Guide, 2005).  
Assumptions 
The central assumption of this dissertation was that the elements of sound, 
multidisciplined training of all personnel involved with the quelling of emergency 
situations play key roles in fostering and promulgating effective radio interoperability. 
Such interoperability must support those who bear the responsibility of saving property, 
reducing injuries, and saving lives in all types of emergency situations, natural disasters, 
and other crises. A further assumption is that the interviewees, whose level of 
involvement in this study is outlined in Chapter 3, would be forthcoming with their 
answers and that such interviews would generate genuine and accurately recollected 
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responses, which also applies to the case studies of real events which are examined for 
further data. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The central aspects of the research problem involve training, budget, and policy to 
address the issues of lack of interoperability. In this basic qualitative study, specific 
aspects of the research problem were explored through the lived experiences of the 
participants. A broader view of these three elements of lack of interoperability that these 
first responders experienced would involve the following needs: (a) training for first 
responders, transportation personnel, central station staff and management in the use of 
assigned radio and mechanical equipment and weaponry for various forms of 
emergencies and life-threatening crises; (b) local, regional, and federal funding 
authorities collaborating with related authorities in researching and developing an 
understanding of the costs and proper usage of essential and practicable equipment 
needed to support addressing various crises as they arise; and (c) state-wide and regional 
emergency policies via governance and operational policies for addressing various forms 
of crises. 
The participants in this study were only first responders from the law enforcement 
and firefighting fields who have been involved in emergency situations in California, 
New York, and Texas. Excluded populations from this field were first responders like 
EMTs, nurses, and physicians based in medical centers and hospitals. However, data 
from the present study had potential transferability to other fields in which first 
responders are employed or volunteer. Other theories related to communication could 
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have formed the conceptual framework. Still, Grebner’s (1956) general model of 
communication theory; Shannon and Weaver’s (1963) information theory; and risk 
communication theory fit the purpose, to explore the perceptions of emergency first 
responders on issues of lack of interoperability, the understanding of which might depend 
on the three essential constituents of training, budget, and policy the best. 
Limitations 
One limitation of the study is that the research was confined to two branches of 
emergency responders: law enforcement and firefighting. Another limitation is the 
participants were chosen from only three predetermined states. There are 47 other U.S. 
states from which to choose, yet that limitation was addressed by a wide geographical 
range: the East, the South, and the West Coast. A third limitation is that the sample group 
was relatively small, and consisted of only 18 first responders with at least 10 years’ 
experience responding to emergency situations in their respective states. The results from 
this basic qualitative study could not be generalized to all first responders in all states 
who have experienced emergencies of disastrous proportions. 
Significance of the Study 
The continued inability of responders, agencies and governmental departments to 
communicate and coordinate their responses to emergency situations can lead to injury 
and, too often, the devastating loss of lives as was reported in the Okanogan Complex 
Fire in August 2015 (Nowell & Steelman, 2015). To illustrate, one need only look at the 
World Trade Center terrorist attacks. The lack of interoperability between police and fire 
radios was a prime factor in the deaths of at least 121 firefighters (Stack, 2015). The 
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Katrina hurricane disaster and the Virginia Tech shootings also illustrate the importance 
of communications interoperability and cross-agency collaboration (Verkuil & Fountain, 
2014). More recently still are the wildfires that swept the Northwest. Wildfires have been 
the most common, widespread disaster involving communication interoperability 
(Insinna, 2013).  
Scientists have reported that global warming trends have increased wildfires more 
than cyclical droughts because the more recent warming trends deprive forests of 
moisture, making them more vulnerable to fires when they do occur (Graham, 2015). 
Because the high temperatures have decreased the snowpack, the fires can reach higher 
altitudes (Graham, 2015). Furthermore, because the fires have spread into more remote 
areas than in the past and personnel have come from faraway places with different levels 
of training and equipment, lack of communication interoperability has increased to the 
point that more lives are being lost in spite of best efforts to cooperate in fighting fires 
(Graham, 2015). 
Whereas there have been many reviews concerning major disasters, such as the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11 or Hurricane Katrina, the significance of this dissertation is its 
attention to localized emergency situations, with its focus on three regions of the country 
to demonstrate how the lack of radio interoperability, despite the size of the populace and 
geographical location, continues to be an issue for emergency responders. Moreover, this 
study examined the lack of radio interoperability as it correlates with the specific issues 
of training, budget, and policy, with the intent of developing advancements in those areas 
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of concern which can lead, ultimately, to increased safety and security for firefighters and 
police officers on the job. 
If the objectives of this study are fulfilled, then its significance to society and to 
those called upon to respond to emergency situations becomes manifest in positive social 
change. If, through research and relevant in-depth analysis, viable conclusions can be 
drawn and meaningful directions leading to an achieved 100% interoperability of radio 
communications in crisis situations can be posited, then the tragic consequences of 
avoidable death and injury in emergency situations can be averted and the study will have 
endowed a valuable service to society. 
Summary and Transition 
In this introductory chapter, I have presented the problem of lack of 
communication for first responders involved in catastrophic events. Few scholarly studies 
have been conducted on this issue, particularly regarding radio interoperability; therefore, 
the study can fill a gap in the literature and contribute to positive social change in society 
when public policy as well as training and the money help to ensure seamless 
communications interoperability to prevent personal injury and loss of lives. The purpose 
of this basic qualitative study was to explore ways to increase safety for emergency 
responders through understanding their lived experiences regarding lack of 
communications interoperability in helping to mitigate natural and human-made disasters. 
The research questions were directed to efforts for ensuring the sustainment of 
interoperability; federal, state, and local policies to improve their safety; and an 
exploration of the roles that training and budget would play in connection to the issues.  
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Chapter 2 presents an exhaustive search of the literature in the field of emergency 
management and shows a significant gap in scholarly studies, specifically on lack of 
communications interoperability. Chapter 3 outlines the steps that will be followed to 
conduct a basic qualitative study of first responders’ experiences with lack of 
communication interoperability during a disaster. In Chapter 4, I present the findings 
from the interviews of first responders and in Chapter 5, I analyze the findings and 
present my conclusions and recommendations for further research on lack of 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Communications interoperability, particularly when it is based on radio 
interoperability, involves two people or more in communication over wireless equipment 
(Timmons, 2007). However, often during a disaster, communication is far from adequate 
(Timmons, 2006). Timmons (2006) named various issues that could impede 
communications interoperability: poor infrastructure, human stress reactions, inadequate 
training and procedures, and lack of policies that would diverge from routines and 
operate well. With due reference to a range of articles corresponding to those themes, 
Chapter 2 includes excerpts taken from the literature, which correspond to and support 
the problem statement of this study that points to the tripartite elements of training, 
budget, and policy as being fundamental elements in securing reliable communications 
interoperability in all emergency situations and crises. 
The general problem is the growing significance of lack of communication 
interoperability in the emergency management field, which has increased in importance 
due to growing natural disasters and human-based acts of terror. More specific are the 
challenges that emergency managers face in insuring severe challenges for first 
responders during particular crises and the roles that policy, budget, and training play in 
having good radio interoperability or in its lack that can lead to injury or loss of lives. In 
addressing these issues, reviews of ineffective policies at the federal, state, and local 
levels have indicated inconsistent budgets and training for first responders (Minnis, 
2013). In a thorough review of the literature, there appears to be a gap in scholarly 
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research on lack of communications interoperability during natural disasters and human 
crises.  
The purpose of this basic qualitative study is to explore how first responders in 
fire safety and law enforcement respond to how they attempt to ensure their safety by 
relying on direct or network communication interoperability based on the premise that 
reliable radio communications and fail-safe communications interoperability depend, in 
the context of this study, on the important constituents of budget, training, and policy. 
Chapter 2 contains an introduction that includes a restatement of the problem and purpose 
of the study, a preview of the sections that constitute the literature review, the strategies 
used for searching the literature, a discussion of the three-pronged conceptual framework, 
sections that review literature on communications interoperability and how the roles of 
budget, policy, and training for first responders are related to lack of communications 
interoperability, a summary of the chapter, and conclusions. 
Literature Search Strategy 
I explored the topic of lack of communications interoperability through various 
primary sources including scholarly articles, government documents, published articles 
geared toward emergency management, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
publications, and web information reporting statistics on disasters, and books on 
emergency management and qualitative research. The primary source used was Walden’s 
online library in addition to other online databases such as ProQuest, Academic Search 
Complete, and Ebsco. Although I attempted to use mostly peer-reviewed articles from 
2012 up, much of the pertinent policy information came from government sources 
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involving security and statistics that were especially prevalent in the years after the 911 
attacks on the homeland. Search terms and descriptors included yet were not limited 
entirely to the following: communication during disasters, communication theories, 
disaster management, emergency management, emergency equipment, emergency 
training, lack of communication or radio interoperability, and public disaster policy. The 
literature review is presented with the following headings: theoretical foundation, 
literature and related literature, a synthesis of literature, a summary, and conclusion. 
Conceptual Framework 
The three theories that form the basis of the present study are Grebner’s general 
model of communication theory, Shannon and Weaver’s model on communication 
theory, and risk communication theory. Grebner’s (1956) model was a foundational 
theory not only for understanding the depth of basic communication but as it was 
developed further over decades, it was also applied to mass communication (McQuail, 
2010). In this seminal work, Grebner argued that the challenge in the field of 
communication was not having any in-depth understanding of its context, for 
communication lacked a framework to discuss technicalities. Not only did the field at the 
time lack the aforementioned understanding but also missing was a way to make sense of 
findings that were needed for “urgently needed judgments” (Grebner, 1956, p. 171). The 
steps in Grebner’s graphic model construction are a good fit for the present study because 
the model specifically involves a fire. Expanding the first step (someone), can be multiple 
team of first responders who respond by gathering to fight a wildfire (Steps 2, 3, 4) and 
attempt to communicate through radio (Steps 5, 6, 7) in the context and conveying the 
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content in ideal communications interoperability (Steps 8, 9) with consequential saving of 
lives. However, when there is a lack of communication interoperability, particularly via 
radio equipment, due to various issues including policies, budget, and training, the 





Figure 1. Steps in the construction of a graphic model. Note. From G. Grebner, “Toward 
a General Model of Communication.” Audio-Visual Communication Review, 1956, Vol. 





Shannon’s (1948) model on community theory was a seminal work often used by 
information systems personnel as a basis for systems involving group communication 
(McEntire, 2007), which is also the foundation of the present study, which involves 
groups of emergency management people. Weaver and Shannon (1963) believed that 
information reduces uncertainty (McEntire, 2007); however, McEntire (2007) claimed 
that being able to decide on a clear meaning of information is something that continues to 
elude researchers and that information communicated gets overcomplicated or 
oversimplified as fundamental as it is to all communication fields: “Information may be 
described as a representation of a message that is processed into something valuable so 
that it may be applied in a practical context” (p. 296). Clear communication can be 
elusive in a disaster when many groups of people come together under differing policies, 
training, and resources, which compounds the outcome of such events. Aside from the 
basic model of Source => Message => Channel => Receiver are the complications 
individual’s experiences in everyday communication as well as during emergencies, also 
known as the dynamics (McEntire, 2007). The latter involve distortion where the source 
does not encode the message with all the intention desired, which leads to loss (Changing 
Minds, 2016). There also is noise, which can be much like a telephone game with people 
but can be more serious or life threatening when the noise entails communication 
equipment that leads to lack of communication interoperability (Changing Minds, 2016). 
Risk communication theory has emerged as an important directive of DHS. The 
DHS issued a report on the need to understand risk communication theory (Sheppard, 
Janoske, & Liu, 2012). The theory is based on Fischhoff (1995), who developed research 
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on ways that emergency managers communicate to the public on events of considerable 
risk. As stated previously, the definition of risk communication theory can be applied to 
any emergency manager who is in charge of risk control, yet if they fail to manage 
efficiently, either it can lead to a crisis or the crisis may result in hindsight for the 
necessity of risk communication (Coombs, 2012). Initial efforts to centralize and 
organize risk communication came from legal and regulatory policies particularly 
regarding right-to-know that was enforced at federal, state, and local levels (Sheppard et 
al., 2012). When experts in risk communication worked with the public, it became more 
important than before to understand processing and acting on communicated messages 
(Sheppard et al., 2012).  
Risk communication theories come into play during the preparedness, response, 
and recovery phases of a disaster. The response phase is particularly relevant to the study 
where first responders were interviewed about the challenges they faced when there was 
lack of communications interoperability during this phase (Sheppard et al., 2012). The 
strategies, or postures during this phase, according to a subtheory, situational crisis 
communication theory, are (a) denial when an organization tries to back off from the 
crisis and may include scapegoating; (b) diminishment to reduce negative effects, which 
may include excusing organizational actions; (c) rebuilding, in which attempts are made 
to reduce or justify perceived damage and excuses for organizational behavior; (d)  
redeeming, in which an organization’s reputation is attempted to be redeemed; and (e) 
bolstering, in which the other three are supported to improve relations between 
organization and stakeholders (Sheppard et al., 2012). Grebner’s general model of 
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communication theory, Shannon and Weaver’s model on communication theory, and risk 
communication theory are all related to lack of communications interoperability due to 
the dependence on good communication for first responders to save lives and property. 
Lack of Communication Interoperability 
Although much of the research on emergency management communications 
focuses on the lack of interoperability, few peer reviewed studies in the United States 
have been carried out on communications at the height of a disaster, whether natural or 
caused by humans (e.g., wildfires and domestic or foreign terrorist attacks). The 
devastation of Hurricane Katrina was so significant that the hurricane keyword put into 
the PsycINFO 3 years ago would have resulted in more than 1,400 hits compared to 10 
years ago when it resulted in fewer than a dozen (Piotrowski, 2013). Interestingly, the 
field of disaster studies is now addressed increasingly in the social sciences, and 
communication interoperability or its absence is highlighted in most studies (Piotrowski, 
2013). 
Disasters are increasing exponentially because of a changing environment and 
nonwar terrorist aggression (Sun, Jones, & Nell, 2013). Recently, conversations and 
policies based on war, terrorism, and other human disasters have become dominant. 
Under these circumstances, exceptions have been made for constitutional protections, 
which result in policy restrictions that can stop the flow of communication during a 
disaster (Sun et al., 2013). These kinds of restrictions, while appropriate in war in the 
case of intentional opponents, are invoked in disasters that lack thinking opponents. Such 
exceptionalism of transparency is seen both in policy and rhetoric and transforms public 
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places into war zones (Sun et al., 2013) from which people (and first responders) can be 
restricted from essential communication. Sun et al. (2013) argued that using war in 
nonwar emergencies must be consciously held as separate events. Then emergency 
personnel can make appropriate determinations on how to communicate in periods of 
crisis. 
An overriding concern in lack of communication interoperability is the sheer 
number of systems that fail to talk to each other. For example, many issues exist 
including VHF high-band signals not working inside a structure as well as would UHF 
700- and 800-MHz ones (Tuite, 2012). Also involved in the licensed bands are the 
personal radios for firefighters, all of which can lead to lack of interoperability. Tuite 
(2012) continued to describe eight open interfaces, yet the major issue is that original 
technologies start to become obsolete in both bandwidth and capacity when cellular 
technology takes over. The new technology is known as long-term evolution or LTE, 
which signals that it is adaptive as innovations continue (Tuite, 2012).  
In the field of emergency management, most of the research centers on medical 
emergency responders and recovery phrases (e.g., Hofmeyer, Scott, & Lagendyk, 2012; 
Holmberg, 2014; Yang et al., 2010). Various studies done in the field of emergency 
management as they relate to lack of communication interoperability have been carried 
out through face to face interviews as were done in the study (e.g., Anthony, Dowden-
Dodgson, O’Hair, Heath, & Eosco, 2014; Huyck, 2013; Huyck, 2015; Revere, Calhoun, 
Baseman, & Oberle, 2015). Explored in this section is research on the historical context 
of emergency communications, lack of communications and radio interoperability, the 
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role of technology and social media in disasters, and emergency alternatives to boost 
interoperability (e.g., balloons, satellites, expanded broadband, mobile units with 
satellites). 
Historical Context 
Spectrum allocations for radio were developed in 1912 in the Radio Act (Hazlett 
& Ohn, 2013). The purpose was to define harmful interference and control it, which led 
to rationalizing regulations (Hazlett & Ohn, 2013). Hazlett and Ohn (2013) posited that 
the system does not function well and limits the spectrum while the system itself has been 
disputing over borders for decades. At the same time, having unclear borders may lead to 
market development as long as they are bundled in an economically efficient way 
(Hazlett & Ohn, 2013). Hazlett and Ohn argued that the main components should be 
flexible and exclusive and frequency borders can be set according to limits involving 
standardized edge emissions. Instead of attending to exact contours of interference, 
regulators need to give bandwidth to responsible agents so that unwarranted 
fragmentation is avoided. 
Instances of lack of communication interoperability, even in historical natural and 
human disasters, are often seen in retrospect and decades after the event. Whether or not 
to join Allied forces in Europe was in strong debate between isolationists and 
interventionists (Burtness & Ober, 2013). President Franklin Roosevelt was among the 
interventionists, and the isolationists saw U.S. involvement as a mistake from which they 
should have not confronted again after the Great War (Burtness & Ober, 2013). However, 
despite intelligence reports about Japan's intent to bomb Pearl Harbor, the person 
32 
 
responsible for reading the decrypted reports decided to engage in a personal activity 
rather than labor over the papers that had been provided to him (Burtness & Ober, 2013). 
If General Marshall, the said person in charge, had done what he customarily would have 
done, he would have been able to issue a warning to personnel at Pearl Harbor and 
prevent the devastating loss of life that was incurred (Burtness & Ober, 2013).  
The general's actions were the culmination of many other inactions on the part of 
military personnel. Although intelligence had been gathered about a sabotage and 
possible attack on U.S. military operations from Japan, many in the War Department 
ignored the severity of the situation (Burtness & Ober, 2013). The problem in the present 
study involves lack of communication interoperability, particularly regarding radio; 
however, ignoring communication of any kind by emergency managers whether from 
radio, through intelligence operations, or social media generally results in devastating 
losses that can be prevented with the preparation that is the end result of competent 
training, sufficient budgets, and supportive policies. Such is the case thoughout history 
(Burtness & Ober, 2013). 
The need for seamless emergency communications has been apparent from the 
turn of the 21st century, from which time both natural and human disasters have been 
increasing rapidly. Barthel (2012) saw the 9/11 attacks on the United States as a 
“watershed event” (p. 2) that made most Americans aware that they were vulnerable to 
strikes not only from outside the country but also from individuals who were nonstate 
actors. As a result, the need to improve security in the homeland was made clear and the 
responses had to come from local to national levels and from private resources. When 
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problems arose regarding the responses, highlighted were issues in command, control, 
and communication areas on all levels (Barthel, 2012). In 2010, the National Security 
Strategy (NSS) revealed that security of U.S. citizens is of everlasting interest to all 
(Barthel, 2012). Furthermore, resilience and security are required due to threats both from 
environmental and terrorist crises (Barthel, 2012).  
Radio Interoperability 
In most natural and human-caused disasters, communication via radio is the main 
means, and communication interoperability, or lack thereof, generally involves radio 
communication. In an early work on interoperability, Timmons (2007) noted that 
defining radio interoperability is far from simple, but it is used as a universal term for 
many types of communication. However, divorced from the issues of radio 
interoperability, one might more broadly define radio interoperability as being the ability 
of emergency responders to achieve clear, uninterrupted, radio communications, essential 
in assisting them in their efforts to quell the types of emergency situations to which they 
have responded (Barthel, 2012). In the same manner, bringing the important matter of 
interagency communications into the picture, the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS) revealed that when communications are interoperable, first responders can 
“communicate within and across agencies and jurisdictions by voice, data, and video” (p. 
8). Simply stated, interoperability exists when radio system operators can connect with 
other radio systems with no problem areas so that emergency responders can 
communicate in a fast and effective way. Such seamless communication can make the 
difference between life and death in many cases (Stack, 2015).  
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The definitions may vary in their wording but not in their essential meaning; they 
accurately affirm the goal of unrestricted radio interoperability as the ideal. However, as 
Barthel (2012) argued, various methods of communication have become almost obsolete 
and include radio/phone patches, liaison use, shared channels, radio swapping, systems 
that are trunked, and control centers or dispatchers relaying important communications. 
Consequently, relying on so many different methods can result in lack of communication 
interoperability (Barthel, 2012). Sharing Barthel’s pessimistic view, Timmons (2007) 
blamed the inefficiencies on relying completely on technology without the proper 
proportions of training and practice, which relate to the research problem calling for 
effective training that would prepare first responders for good communications 
interoperability. 
Barthel (2012) claimed that whether the disaster is natural or derived from human 
attacks, all responding organizations must “respond, manage forces, and provide critical 
support as a cohesive team” (p. 1). Such organizations include tribal, local, state, or 
federal levels and their fire, medical, and law enforcement responders. United, they give 
efficient, integrated, and timely responses effectively through communication, control, 
and command (Barthel, 2012). Further, key to that integrated response is communication 
interoperability (Barthel, 2012). Finally, the main goal of the NSS is to reinforce security 
and as a result, safety. However, if all else fails, rapid response and recovery must result 
through intense collaboration of government and private actors, and to ensure such 
collaboration, the United States must invest (budget and policy) in communication 
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interoperability for those who respond first to increasing homeland disasters (Barthel, 
2012). 
During a wildfire, there are many obstacles to the intelligibility of radio signals. 
Background noise of different kinds can be a factor (Atkinson & Catellier, 2012). 
Atkinson and Catellier (2012) used a test in which the communicator said a word and 
then another word that rhymed with the first or last consonant. It was played back using a 
vocoder under different conditions (no background noise, with a fire truck pump panel, 
an SCBA mask, low and higher alarms, a rotary saw, a chainsaw, a fog nozzle, an 
amplified mask, and combinations of the conditions such as with a mask and a rotary saw 
cutting a metal garage door). Overall, though there were some environments where 
neither was intelligible, analog radios performed better than digital ones (Atkinson & 
Catellier, 2012).  
Numerous reasons can be pointed to for inadequate or failed radio 
interoperability. It is understood that communications barriers often materialize from 
insufficient radio infrastructure, but they can also result from the behavioral reactions of 
first responders in stressful situations, dysfunctional intergovernmental relations tied to 
inadequate policies and inadequate training (Huyck, 2015). Lack of broad-based training 
and confusing procedures can lead directly to the failure of radio networks. These factors 
show up as a multilevel lack of interest when it comes to instituting innovative 
operational policies, which often differ markedly from routine habits and deep-seated 
practices (Huyck, 2015). To modify and convert the radio systems would require updated 
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policies, and unfortunately, these polices are almost always ineffective due to their 
obsolescence in today’s demanding conditions (Huyck, 2015). 
It is clearly up to regional policymakers to work together to plan ways to obviate 
failed communications barriers wherever they occur. In an early work, Brito (2007) 
argued that lack of interoperability between law enforcement officers and firefighters, in 
the same city, could lead to devastating consequences. That rationale extends to 
emergencies that involve outside jurisdictions that must have cooperation among various 
agencies. Furthermore, the most simple emergencies necessitate cooperation between fire 
and law enforcement teams (Brito, 2007). While urban centers like New York have good 
interagency collaboration, smaller cities have not yet reached their interoperability goal 
(Brito, 2007; Wang & Zlatanova, 2016).  
The failure to have reliable radio interoperability has, all-too-often, given rise to 
critical situations, which result in the further-on failures to carry out the mission or its 
operational necessities and which, in turn, have resulted in injury and, in some cases, loss 
of life (Hutchins & Timmons, 2007). To an observer, unacquainted with the on-the-
ground exigencies of an emergency situation, radio equipment might be first looked at as 
being the primary reason underlying the lack of radio interoperability (Hutchins & 
Timmons, 2007). However, in support of the claim of experts that improving or 
upgrading hardware is neither a totally-viable nor comprehensive answer to the problem, 
Hutchins and Timmons (2007) have elaborated on another avenue for overcoming a 
significant part of the problem, that of training and the funding thereof, which is in 
support of two of the principal themes of this dissertation. Although they observed 
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funding for training that came with grants for better interoperability, which demonstrated 
recognition of the importance of the issue, their application to training was not specified 
well. As a result, when jurisdictions did note training in their grant applications, they did 
not iterate the specifics of the actual training. 
Such lack of accountability is an important statement of concern with respect to 
the issues at the heart of all three elements of this dissertation. It speaks to the need to 
allocate funds more effectively—not to waste resources on expensive hardware (the 
budgeting factor), without understanding what type of equipment would actually be 
operationally beneficial. Hutchins and Timmons (2007) further pointed out the need to 
organize the proper training programs on how and under what circumstances the 
equipment is to be utilized–altogether referencing budgeting, training, and policy factors. 
They offered a series of observations with regard to various aspects of training programs 
and how to address the various interoperability inadequacies noted: 
• Training on prioritization of radio messages and introduction of the concept of 
communication alternatives, other than public safety radio.  
• Face-to-face communication and sector-level task coordination are [examples] 
of ways to achieve objectives without the use of radio resources. 
• Unacknowledged messages to the incident commander are an area of 
concern…. 
• Have personnel at the emergency scene assigned exclusively to facilitate 
communications support for the incident commander. 
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Usually, there is limited transmission in normal radio-frequency coverage in 
buildings (Hayes, 2015). An intra-volume centralized array might work for building 
public safety systems (Young et al., 2013). Young et al. (2013) reported on how wireless 
devices were arbitrarily placed in different building locations to ensure higher radio 
interoperability. They found that this array strategy could boost transmissions up to 10 
dB, using only four elements. Additionally, though, with only two elements, simulations 
and measurements averaged 2 to 6 dB. 
Ewart and Dekker (2013) explored how talkback radio can create a sense of 
community during disasters. Members of the audience contribute to the narrative during 
crises as they play out. The researchers argued that such programs can pose challenges to 
normal communication and government actors because the community uses talkback 
programs as a means of obtaining direct information in a politically homogeneous group. 
The audience members can also subvert authoritarian control of the message. Ewart and 
Dekker concluded that this kind of control from the bottom to the top is similar to using a 
social medium. Still, it is not exactly the same because there is still a degree of editing 
and control to public access in talkback radio. 
Issues Regarding Communication Technologies 
 Technologies have been used to develop state-of-the-art communications but in 
times of disaster, such as in the days before and after Hurricane Katrina made landfall in 
New Orleans in 2005, they can obstruct easy communication (Davis & Robbin, 2015). 
Davis and Robbin (2015) examined response networks whose job it was to focus on 
evacuating people, giving them shelter, and protecting the public. They researched 
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federal policies and local disaster planners, organizational networking, and 
communication technologies (ICTs), using grounded theory to show how failures in 
sharing information, communicating, employing technology reduced the efficiency of the 
organizational network and thereby led to significant loss of lives. Davis and Robbin 
concluded that those responsible should use a different theoretical framework to test the 
probability of disasters as well as social-ecological system discernment and committing 
and investing in data, metrics, and indicators to check progress toward resilience. Finally, 
they recommend adopting a more global perspective and investing in strengthening and 
redesigning infrastructure (Davis & Robbin, 2015).  
Organizational and Technological Responses 
There are no uniform public safety communication standards in the United States 
but rather it is a patchwork phenomenon with a variety of frequencies, protocols, and 
systems (Huyck, 2015; Mountjoy, 2005). The response to this unhappy state of affairs by 
the State of Texas was, in collaboration with the DHS, the preparation of a statewide plan 
for improving interoperability in crisis situations. The F Plan employed a network 
approach using demonstrable leadership at the regional level through the Texas Councils 
of Governments (COGs) and adherence to the DHS’s national technical requirements for 
wireless public safety communications and interoperability (National Public Safety 
Telecommunications Council, 2016). One of the key elements of this plan is the 
SAFECOM Interoperability Continuum illustrated in Figure 2. This diagram depicts the 
core facets of interoperability according to a state’s need for organizational preparedness. 
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Progression along the Interoperability Continuum is contingent on the following 
key drivers: (a) leadership commitment; (b) fostering collaboration across disciplines 
(EMS, fire, law enforcement, and all public safety agencies) through leadership support; 
(c) using interoperability solutions regularly; (d) coordinating across all elements 
(frequency of use, governance, standard operating procedures, technology, and 
training/exercises); and € progressing along all the elements of the continuum in parallel 
(DHS, 2011). Significantly, Figure 2 shows that nationwide efforts have now begun to 
demonstrate that there is an expanded characterization of interoperability beyond just the 
technical (the components of the radio equipment’s hardware and software). Such efforts 
include addressing the external deficiencies having to do with behavioral and procedural 
elements as well (DHS, 2008). Behavioral deficiencies speak to the need for more 
practicable operational training; deficient procedural elements speak to the need for 
innovative policy adjustments, in addition to the operational training with respect to 




Figure 2. Interoperability continuum. Note. Retrieved from http://npstc.org 
 
 
Kożuch, Małyjurek, and Kożuch (2015) discussed both vertical and horizontal 
communication in emergency management as important factors of responsiveness 
involving independent agencies. While vertical communication involves the creation of 
guidelines and norms for operations, horizontal communication involves flexibility in the 
organization and building relationships to align with unstable circumstances and other 
variables (Kożuch et al. 2015). Firefighters, law enforcers, and medical emergency crews 
are closely linked due to their status as first responders. Other units to which they are 
linked are private agencies, service agencies, and social organizations, to name a few. 
These interorganizational relationships rely on formal and informal ties and 
organizational and legal regulations. Therefore, the networks that have to function in 
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disasters and other crises should develop relationships every day to develop mutual aid, 
trust, commitment, and consciousness (Kożuch et al., 2015). Finally, the greater and more 
dangerous the disaster, the more important the need to use advanced systems of 
communications due to the abundance of real-time information that has to be processed 
to make the best decisions (Kożuch et al., 2015). 
Similar to Kawasaki et al. (2013) in their study involving crowdsourced 
geospacial volunteers, Kryvasheyeu and Chen (2014) limited their study to users of 
varying geo-locations of the Twitter social network. The researchers analyzed Twitter 
messages in the pre, actual, and post super storm event known as Hurricane Sandy. The 
framework of the study was the friendship paradox's behavioral and topological 
properties. Kryvasheyeu and Chen found that an advantage was gained in the centrality of 
users' networks and whether the participants were outside of the hurricane's radius or 
within it determined the extent of the advantage users had. Whether inside or outside the 
disaster area, they found a universality in emotional response, which can open "a 
possibility to implement a simple sentiment sensing technique that can detect and locate 
disasters" (Kryvasheyeu & Chen, 2014, p. 1). 
Technology (radio communications equipment) is at the heart of radio operability, 
but, as with any mechanically-devised systems, technological challenges do arise. It was 
on an emergency training exercise on Long Island in New York that one of the 
unforeseen, but serious, technological challenges in regards to interoperability was 
identified (Martinez, 2014). Martinez (2014) cited a case in which problems involving 
beyond-line-of-sight arose due to interference with operating 800 MHz portable radios 
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from reinforced below-grade structures. The problem was solved by placing relay 
personnel along the sight line of the communications. Although the strategy was not the 
preferred nor long-term solution to the problem, which had to be addressed at a later 
time, it does reveal a significant ancillary aspect to the role of training with regard to 
radio interoperability.  
In summarizing the state of interoperability across states, Henry (2012) reported 
that in general, planning activities stemming from grants lacked integration. Even 
emergency alerts and other important notifications fail to cross state boundaries and when 
they are operable, other area responders often cannot interpret them correctly (Henry, 
2012). As a result, not only are efforts duplicated, but they also show gaps in the ability 
of emergency personnel to be prepared and able to go through with needed response to 
crises.  
Henry (2012) posited that there is an ongoing issue involving the ability of 
personnel from states to connect technological analysis with intelligence and coordinate 
sectors linking homeland security with public health. With varying culture, business 
strategies, and missions, it is difficult to link the practices of both sectors (Henry, 2012). 
Much of homeland security is classified and thus cannot be shared with public health 
institutions regarding decision-making and planning. Regarding budget, grants for federal 
preparedness are decreasing; otherwise, fusion centers and public health preparedness 
could function. Consequently, to save funds, state leaders are attempting to consolidate 
programming, to collaborate, and to eschew duplication in the midst of rising crises and 
natural disasters (Henry, 2012). In addition, in relating technology to budget issues, much 
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of the equipment is obsolete with high replacement costs. Furthermore, Henry 
emphasized that technology is key to interoperability to the extent that, without 
equipment, there can be no communications (Henry, 2009). 
 Wireless technology seems to be a solution toward communications 
interoperability, but it is not without threats to secure communications. Although wireless 
networks for communication serve public safety networks well using endpoints such as 
cell phones, tablets, laptop computers, and mobile camcorders, the same system can pose 
security risks due to complex interconnectivity issues (McGee, Coutière, & Palamara, 
2012; Oxendine, Sonwalkar, & Waters, 2012). The complexity involves combining 
coworkers, video surveillance, endpoints, sensor systems, and communications in 
general. If the networks are breached by criminals, then others could gain access as well.  
McGee et al. (2012) warned that public safety and first responders may not be 
familiar with the newer innovative networks though they do know how about controlling 
physical security, redundancy, and encryption. Lack of knowledge may compromise the 
systems; thus, crime databases especially need protection. McGee et al. discussed the 
challenges in public safety network design. Security threats pose the need for protection 
against eavesdropping; protection against corrupted information; securing internal 
network interfaces between network elements; protection against data exfiltration; 
protection against denial of service; and securing the operations, administration, and 
maintenance network (McGee et al., 2012). Maintaining the security of a network is 
challenging in the face of disaster. Therefore, it is imperative to incorporate strong 
security measures in the beginning with scheduled follow-up involving assessments and 
45 
 
audits so that the endpoints in addition to the network are “securely available under 
extreme conditions” (McGee et al., 2012). 
Shouldis (2013), in discussing radio communication in fire departments, noted the 
importance of communication for command and control. In using a fire protocol known 
as CARDS, firefighters can recognize every communication and transmit assignments 
completed throughout the combined statistical area (CSA). This structure consists of 
nonprofits, public entities, and private companies. CARDS is an acronym that relates the 
following: C-Completed assignments must be sent to the IC so awareness of the situation 
can be ascertained; A-Acknowledge every message to improve good decision-making; R-
resource requirements that change depending on the situation so that all human resources, 
apparatuses, or equipment is readied in a staging area; D-Dangerous situations that can be 
found by on-the-ground firefighters so they can radio the changing conditions to obtain 
appropriate responses (e.g., conditions that might alter offensive responses to defensive 
ones; and S-Silence to turn responders into listeners rather than reactors when 
appropriate). A web-based portal overlaid on an Internet cloud can help the information 
exchange be smooth and effective (Shouldis, 2013). However, it is necessary to safeguard 
safety, performance, and security when using cloud technology (Liotine, Howe, & 
Ibrahim, 2013). 
Communication Pre- and Postdisaster  
In a postdisaster study, Bilve et al. (2014) assessed the need for an early warning 
alert and response network or EWARN to mitigate risks of transmissing diseases of 
epidemic proportions. As a result, emergency personnel would be better prepared for 
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detection, assessment, and response to diseases that follow a tsunami. A tsunami did hit 
the Solomon and Santa Cruz Islands in early February 2013 and killed 10 people. Over 
4700 others lost their homes. In the Santa Cruz area, two-fifths of the population was 
displaced, and those who were had to live in temporary camps with primitive conditions. 
There was little access to clean water or sanitary facilities. Only a few weeks after the 
disaster, the EWARN system was operational so that negative health conditions could be 
reported right away. Within a two-month period, people could be informed about 1177 
syndrome or target disease cases, which led to an 85% compliance rate of reporting data 
and no epidemics during the time of displacement (Bilve et al., 2014). Such a system can 
function both as early prewarning and postdisaster emergency management that can save 
lives at all stages of a disaster. 
Community Involvement 
 Not only is interoperability the responsibility of first responders, but also of 
members of the community who are involved in a disaster (Hardie & Kitchen, 2014). 
Hardie and Kitchen (2014) recommended that communities investigate how to run 
efficiently a multidisciplinary, multiagency exercise. The researchers conducted a case 
study with the purpose of providing a framework for planning and learning how the 
components interact with the primary objective of not giving up on individuals needs in 
the face of achieving common goals (Hardie & Kitchen, 2014). 
Areas prone to cyclones have been the scenes of millions of deaths for the past 200 
years. However, the mortality in Bangladesh has decreased from half a million deaths 40 
years ago to just over four thousand in 2007, largely through coordinated community 
47 
 
efforts (Haque et al., 2012). The significant reduction is mostly due to improved shelters, 
evacuations, early warnings, reforestations, and built up embankments in coastal areas 
along with better communication and raised awareness. Rather than build large centers, it 
is more practical to use existing places (set every two kilometers) were people congregate 
such as schools and mosques (Haque et al., 2012). 
Educational programs for children in primary schools on cyclones, for an example 
of community involvement, can be based on a model used in Cuba, and houses in 
vulnerable areas should be raised more than 3 feet off the ground. Most important, policy 
makers, planners, and developers should rely heavily on local knowledge for adaptation 
and environmental planning (Haque et al., 2012). One of the most important themes of 
improving communication interoperability, as has been noted by many researchers, is to 
coordinate local, state, and national efforts and insure transparency over secretive 
government control so that all first responders and the people they protect can coordinate 
their efforts to prevent slowdowns in interoperability that can result in loss of lives (e.g., 
Atkinson, 2014; Bertrand, 2012; Fu, Zhou, Zhang, Chan, & Burkhart, 2012). 
Political Interference with Communication in Other Countries 
Natural disasters are widespread on the increase all over a rapidly changing 
environment, and leaders of many different nations have all had to address the role of 
communications interoperability during these challenging swaths of destruction (Fabac, 
Đalog, & Zebić, 2015). Often, through media or official government reporting of these 
disasters, discrepancies exist between reality and what the public is allowed to know. In 
western Russia in 2010, a series of wildfires destroyed almost 10 million hectares of peat 
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areas and forest land (Bertrand, 2012) emphasized the consequences when data come 
from government sources. To Bertrand (2012), the reporting discrepancy is significant. 
Although the Global Fire Monitoring Center reported the 10 million hectares, the Russian 
government reported only 1.8 million hectares of damage, which was lower than that of 
the previous year. This underreporting served to communicate the competence of the 
government in its ability to address and overcome disasters. However, it also highlighted 
how strictly information is influenced and controlled by government policies. 
Although the main role of government as competent leadership was confined to 
the recovery phases, most of the quelling of the disaster in the response and emergency 
management stages was in the hands of first responders and other forces. However, to 
bolster the image of the government, Vladimir Putin conveyed that the fires (160,000 
total in 2010) were “personal, delegated, and impossible” (Bertrand, 2012, p. 39). 
Bertrand argued that this power personification was one of a leader’s omniscience that 
could be viewed as a legacy from Soviet times. The government personification 
portrayed a state of technology with complete control of disasters, which in reality does 
not guarantee security (Bertrand, 2012). 
In a similar case regarding government policy in the face of natural disasters was 
the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2008. The event led to the deaths of almost 69,000 
people with almost 18,000 people missing and 46 million people either injured or 
affected negatively (Fu et al., 2012). In an analysis of media coverage, the hardline 
policies of the Chinese government were exposed in the aftermath of the disaster. Mass 
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media are important in their ability to communicate public information how people can 
obtain safety and security during a crisis.  
During the earthquake, foreign and Chinese media were allowed to issue detailed 
reports on the event, which was a departure from the usual controlled media by the 
central government where images of the devastation were projected globally even though 
government leaders made efforts to restrict the media content (Fu et al., 2012). Reporters 
ignored the warnings and continued to report, opening a 2-week window into the disaster. 
In their comparative report, Fu et al. (2012) contrasted the strategies of government 
media vs. market-oriented media. In spite of more open media policies in the United 
States, Fu et al. found that in the U.S. disaster used for comparison, Hurricane Katrina, 
the U.S. media capitalized on supports from institutions and responses of government (a 
thematic framework) instead of individual anecdotes and responsibilities (an episodic 
framework). 
Not only do emergency responders and the public need to know all of the 
consequences of a natural disaster, but scientists also must have all the facts to be able to 
make assessments from an objective view. Shore (2013) emphasized communications as 
a necessity for scientists who are learning difficult lessons from Fukushima. Scientists 
need to communicate with each other as well as the public better. Shore's panel under the 
Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF), where radiation investigations have been 
carried out for 60 years, compiled an account regarding risk estimates for radiation in an 
environment of high uncertainty. Their data were used by WHO for its report, which was 
received by many groups both nationally and internationally. Limitations included the 
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overplaying or underplaying of a serious situation by the press and by government 
officials, which makes policy setting challenging. The panel members determined to 
abide by science alone without giving in to political pressure. Still, everyone was brought 
to the table and allowed opinions (Shore, 2013).  
The biggest controversy involved the level of radiation to which people had been 
exposed (Shore, 2013). Thyroid cancer was the biggest risk, and again, because of 
government policies and secrecy, children were drinking milk from exposed cows days 
before the public was informed about the extent of the danger of this devastating natural 
and manmade disaster. On the other hand, the press, looking for sensationalism, 
overplayed parts of the Fukushima aftermath. Therefore, they planned to neither 
exaggerate the information nor cover it up (Shore, 2013). Eventually, the Japanese 
government and accepted the legitimacy of RERF's findings, which are ongoing. The 
committee had also been gathering data on the survivors of the atomic bomb, yet even 
with these people ranging from their 50s through 60s, they do not yet know the degree of 
genetic risk there is genetically (Shore, 2013). 
The media culture of being a watchdog, which is prevalent in other places is only 
at the beginning stages in China (Fu et al., 2012). Contrasting thematic and episodic 
frameworks showed different focuses. Market-oriented media shows more transparency 
in communicating disasters at all stages. Fu et al. (2012) acknowledged that the 
provincial media can be significant in their ability to give full coverage to unfolding 
stories because they are somewhat less regulated than are government media. 
Nonetheless, the impact would be less significant if no government policies allow the 
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deregulating of media and more open information sharing, policies that become more 
significant on a global scale as government bias interferes with transparent 
communication though media censorship and political influence (Fu et al., 2012). Thus, 
the need for such transparency is paramount for policy makers.  
Alternative Strategies to Ensure Communication Interoperability 
Often, especially in remote areas where wildfires rage, there is lack of 
conventional radio interoperability as well as access to cellphone and Broadband towers. 
Alternative strategies are necessary to save lives. They include balloons, smart earth 
satellites, and mobile stations. The widespread mobile networks can be used by most 
people to receive alerts and colorful hot air balloons can convey warnings in remote areas 
(Haque et al., 2012). In connection with this balloon technology (Haque et al., 2012), in 
the United States, the Federal Communications Commission wrote regulations for aerial 
stations including balloons that could ensure radio interoperability in the case of areas 
experiencing large-scale disasters that have cause their communication system to go 
down (Magnuson, 2012). Some of these systems can transmit for up to four full days 
after a disaster has taken place. Space Data of Arizona has used balloons that fly at high 
altitudes for military and industrial applications. These altitudes, known as near space, do 
not have high winds and they also have a wide range for radio interoperability 
(Magnuson, 2012). 
Another system that can aid in interoperability in remote areas is smart earth 
observation satellites (Visser & Dawood, 2004). These satellites can not only take high-
resolution photogrphs, but they can also yield significant amounts of data with little to no 
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upgrades on the current system: "Remote sensing satellites currely operate on a 'store and 
forward' paradigm, where data [are] stored on the satellite until the satellite is in view of 
the ground station" (Visser & Dawood, 2004, p. 893). Subsequently, the data can be 
telemetered below where emergency responders can be assured of necessary information. 
The purpose of Visser and Dawood's research was to elaborate the design of this 
synchronous system on a mission to monitor and detect the events during natural 
disasters. Further research involved assessments of fire fronts and tracking of fire 
movement (Visser & Dawood, 2004). 
Agencies at the local, state, and federal levels as well as private entities are all 
working together to try to ensure communications interoperability. However, among loss 
of service, bureaucratic snaps, and competing private agencies, alternatives have their 
challenges. In response to large-scale crises like the September 11 attacks and Hurricane 
Katrina, a National Emergency Communications Plan was developed by the DHS (Hu, 
Knox, & Kapucu, 2014). However, when later disasters like Hurricane Sandy hit, as 
much as a quarter of all cell phones and other communication media lost service (Insinna, 
2013; Piotrowski, 2013). Although emergency managers have been seeking radio 
interoperability in different localities, they learned much about the vulnerability of the 
system in a disaster (Insinna, 2013). Most importantly, when general communications are 
down for days, there is no way to call 911 to get immediate help. Satellite companies 
have offered what their executives think is the perfect solution, but rather than location 
diversity, there is only vendor diversity when two companies can be in the same area and 
are therefore vulnerable when satellite service can go out (Insinna, 2013).  
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Furthermore, in emergencies, vendors may not be readily available on off-
business hours and satellite communication can also be cost prohibitive. The Red Cross 
had moving satellite services in vans, but they work with 50 different partners, some 
private (Insinna, 2013). Unless there is much advance preparation, some weak links in the 
communication chain can cause the entire system to collapse. At one point, the Red Cross 
had to fall back on making announcements on bullhorns and handing out printed flyers in 
communities because all technology had failed (Insinna, 2013). 
Congress in 2012 allocated a portion of the communications spectrum known as 
the D Block with a cost of $7 billion to implement. Instead of developing a stand-alone 
network, they decided to use existing infrastructure for wireless communications 
(Insinna, 2013). There are many budget shortfalls to address over the years it will take to 
build the system but it is a legislative priority. However, additional problems arise when 
small localities cannot afford the equipment necessary to run the system. It is challenging 
to get all first responders to use standardized devices that would lead to better 
communications interoperability (Insinna, 2013). Still, some work is being done in 
different locations. In Bethpage, Long Island, the DHS Center is working with first 
responders via tabletop exercises so private innovators can see first hand what emergency 
managers do so that all entities can be prepared for the next natural crisis (Insinna, 2013). 
During a crisis, emergency response has always involved volunteers. In the digital 
age, volunteers can be virtual too. One form of communication is through conventional 
geographic information systems, or GIS, which has been updated to a format that can 
attract wide participation and thus becomes "more dynamic, more transparent, and [more] 
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decentralised" (Kawasaki et al., 2013, p. 201). As acknowledged by Fu et al. (2012), the 
earthquake in Sichuan lacked a coordinated response due to conflicts between 
governmental and market news data. To arrive at a solution for coordination of 
information, the Center for Geographical Analysis at Harvard University developed a 
geospacial portal to connect to a global community; they found that the timing of the 
project was vital (Kawasaki et al., 2013). Through browsing geospacial data and web 
mapping, a wide network, not imaginable 10 years ago, can use both professionals and 
volunteers from the public to mitigate disasters. Such crowdsourcing is the wave of the 
future that will only grow in the next several years (Kawasaki et al., 2013).  
The Role of Social and Other Media 
Propagating information in emergency situations is key to emergency managers, 
no matter the operational scale. Such issues have become most apparent over the past 15 
years. Communication gaps among governmental agencies and citizens have often led to 
scores of deaths and injuries (Wukich & Mergel, 2015). One way to reduce these gaps is 
through social media, though media are never a first resort in emergencies (Wukich & 
Mergel, 2015). Lacking in the research are all phases of emergency management; most 
research is based on response and recovery phases, Wukich and Mergel (2015) analyzed 
a 3-month period of Twitter messages to analyze all emergency management stages. 
They found that some agencies used interactive approaches to disseminating information, 
many-to-many and one-to-one even though the majority of messages were more 
traditional government communication protocols that involved the government 
communicating with thousands of citizens (Wukich & Mergel, 2015).  
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Reinforcing the idea that social media cannot be overlooked as an important 
communication interoperability tool, is the example of the terrorist attack in Kenya in 
2013 at the Westgate mall, which resulted in 147 people injured and 67 deaths (Simon, 
Goldberg, Aharonson-Daniel, Leykin, & Adini, 2014). During this 4-day seige, Twitter 
became more than social media but a "crucial channel of communication between the 
government, emergency responders and the public, facililtating the emergency 
management of the event (Simon et al., 2014, p. 10). TwitterMate is a data gathering tool 
for "tweets," and this system collected, stored, and scrutinized outstanding hashtags that 
came from the accounts of emergency responders, NGOs, and private citizens. The 
67,849 tweets were divided into four categories: terror attack, geographical location, 
organizations, and social support (Simon et al., 2014). That way, the threat assessment 
could constrantly be updated. Social media are widely accessible and should be seriously 
considered during disasters in which large numbers of people are involved. Furthermore, 
procedures should be standardized so emergency managers can monitor, synchonize, and 
integrate feeds to give out public information and crucial responder material (Simon et 
al., 2014). 
Taking a variety media into consideration serves well at all stages of a disaster, 
whether over cell phones, television, news portals, SMS, or microblogs; such media can 
play a part in pre-warning to ensure community safety and security (Zhang et al., 2014). 
Furthermore, because individuals of different ages, genders, and socioecnomic have 
varying preferences for the type of media they use, dissemination of disaster prewarnings 




The U.S. government has been especially involved in creating policies to update 
and fund emergency management systems and consider recommendations of experts. 
Emergency communications, whether in a terrorist attack or a natural disaster like a 
hurricane, are vulnerable. The GAO (2011) recommended that the DHS put in strong 
efforts to implement the National Emergency Communication Plan. The key areas of 
vulnerability are in “capacity, communication, and interoperability continuation response 
in communities” (p. 481). 
To develop the broadband network sustainably, funding sources needed 
identification. From a policy perspective, Moore (2011) made several recommendations 
including the need for sufficient funding, development of radios that would match the 
spectrum, a governance structure to oversee effectiveness and uniformity, and 
collaboration with commercial entities to have enough resources in knowledge and skills. 
Budka et al. (2011) echoed Moore’s (2011) emphasis on the importance of the broadband 
network, adding that the U.S. Federal Communications Commission had chosen the Long 
Term Evolution or LTE application to develop the U.S. Public Safety 700 MHz band. 
Budka et al. posited that both the LTE-based broadband for public safety and the required 
movement of narrowband system to thinner channel widths would facilitate carrying 
critically important services over the LTE. Budka et al. presented some of the challenges 
intrinsic in working with legacy narrowband systems, emphasizing interoperability. 
Having an emergency alert system is essential for all kinds of emergencies, either 
a new one or through an existing one. To employ the latter, all personnel in the system 
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whether on the state or local level should complete the Integrated Public Alert and 
Warning System process, known as IPAWS so that both law enforcement and other 
emergency responders can communicate security and safety issues (Leiva, 2014). The 
Integrated Public Alert and Warning System or IPAWS was set up by FEMA in 2004 to 
integrate the federal Emergency Alert System as well as other systems to save lives and 
lower damage to property (Goldstein, 2013).  
The Government Accountability System (GAO) in 2009 revealed that there was 
slow progress in effecting IPAWS. Thus, both the FCC and FEMA did a national EAS 
test in 2011 so that GAO could review it including (a) what barriers are affecting 
implementation of IPAWS and (b) to attend to the weaknesses identified. GAO 
recommended closer work between the FCC and FEMA so that states will have the 
necessary guidance to test EAS regularly and to assess IPAWS components. The DHS 
agreed with the recommendations of the GAO, giving examples of what actions could be 
taken to comply with the recommendations (GAO, 2009).  
Baldini, Fovino, Braghin, and Trombella (2013) discussed a new “wireless 
communication technology that allows for adaptive configuration of the reception 
parameters of a terminal, based on the information collected from the environment” (p. 
925). The spectrum sharing can work in the military, for commercial use, and toward 
public safety. Baldini et al. stated that in some cases, policies must be enforced to allocate 
resources via spectral bands. These policies should reveal which users can access them, 
what resources are available, and what circumstances must exist. Thus, it is important to 
establish protocols in advance should an authority come on the scene and confusion result 
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from unclear directives. Baldini et al. presented a framework involving trust negotiation 
to ensure distributed access policies that rely on more than one party. 
In 1988, based on the Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials, a 
project was inaugurated known as Project 25 (P25) or APCO-25. The project 
encompassed standards for digital public-safety radio and radio communication in 
general for North American countries (Tuite, 2012). P25 went beyond two-way 
communication between dispatchers and first responders but as dispatchers in the role of 
a connection to other agencies, usually via telephone. During the time that P25 was in 
operation, mostly for hardware, officials were working on standardizing methods for 
multiple agencies to work together when small events turned into disasters (Tuite, 2012). 
Tuite (2012) gave an example of the Colorado wildfires where fire safety and law 
enforcement agencies worked together on many levels from local to federal in addition to 
ground and air forces from the Bureau of Land Management and National Forest Service. 
Around 2011, the Harris Corporation launched BeOn, an innovation that allows its 
subscribers communicate, whether they are on public-safety or cellular networks. 
Although not previously true, Harris updated their technology to have P25 capacities 
(Tuite, 2012). 
Involved in the difficulties in organizing caterers, ground crew members, 
helicopter pilots, borate bombers, and Red Cross workers, to name a few of those 
involved in fighting a natural disaster, the Incident Command System (ICS) had many 
challenges. To apply training and planning for such events, the entire system must 
evolve; standards cannot be rigid in the face of communication innovations (Tuite, 2012). 
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While some agencies use on frequency, others use multiple frequencies. Moreover, there 
are times when people must go off network and instead use portable repeaters or 
repeaters on vehicles or communications radio-to-radio. Tuite describes ICS as one that 
emphasizes planning and structure and that the command structures required should be 
simple (Figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 3. The ICS structure 
 
To be effective to the fullest extent during a crisis and in its aftermath, emergency 
responders must consider wireless communications in capacity and capability as well as 
giving accessing public space and roaming capabilities to public safety networks (Moore, 
2011; Moore, 2013). Thus, there needs to be public policy behind such wireless 
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expansion. An expanding spectrum for radio frequencies is essential for public safety. 
Moore (2011) argued that the network to suit this spectrum needs building and the 
equipment capable of meeting the new mobile Broadband standards must be developed 
and deployed. Moore outlined three bills before Congress that obliged the FCC to 
“transfer a spectrum license intended for commercial use, known as D Block, to the 
license holder for adjacent frequencies already assigned to public safety, known as the 
Public Safety Broadband License” (p. 149). A few years later, the U.S. Congress was to 
consider a First Responder Network Authority or FirstNet and the Next-Generation 
Communications for Public Safety by the Congressional Research Service based on the 
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012. Seven billion dollars were 
provided for costs in planning and launching FirstNet (Moore, 2015). 
Budget 
Huyck (2015) argued that it is only when public policies from the local to the 
national levels find funding for emergency managers to ensure radio interoperability in 
the long run. If networks are to be expanded technologically, then not only training and 
planning are necessary but also ways to have adequate budgets to meet the unfunded 
mandates (Huyck, 2015). Furthermore, it is not funding alone that will promise solutions 
but also consensus in the cultures and missions among first responders on how to reach 
full interoperability in emergency communication (Huyck, 2015). 
Many fire departments, for example, do not have access to the most up to date 
equipment and larger departments that do, do not always use the equipment on a regular 
basis or have integrated it into standard procedure (Huyck, 2013). Additionally, grants 
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are available to fund some of the mandates, but agencies may not hear of their availability 
on time or miss deadlines (Huyck, 2013). 
 One example of federal funding was signed by President Obama, where the 
United States government initially funded the P25 network for $7 billion. This network 
involves 10 “MHz of paired spectrum in the 700-MHz band for public safety, allowing a 
5-MHz channel in each direction” in addition to a 700-MHz network for broadband 
services for the public-safety community” in a tax relief bill (Tuite, 2012, p. 5). The 
network will continue in its innovations for 3 to 5 years. In a Harris Corporation 
demonstration, access at a distance to the high capacity system at the core was shown and 
dispatchers could see police cars and know it was ready for communication through 
push-to-talk calls via the BeOn application. The application has P25 features through 
broadband. 
Training/Response 
According to Henry (2009), “Interoperability requires the commitment of 
different agencies in the public safety community with responsibilities in a time of 
crisis…. To that end, 31 states used a Statewide Interoperable Governing Body (SIGB) to 
administer interoperability programs in state government” (p. 9). This is an important 
advancement in the matter of support for radio interoperability touching explicitly on 
governmental policies. Nevertheless, Henry also contended that implementation remains 





• Informal oversight and governance; 
• Uncoordinated Standard Operating Procedures; 
• Incompatible and obsolete technology; 
• Infrequent and inconsistent trainings and exercises; and 
• Difficulty integrating interoperability into routine, daily use. 
To be successful, interoperability requires shared management, control, policies 
and procedures and must be multidisciplinary and multijurisdictional (Henry, 2009). The 
solution seems simple: The deficiencies are well-defined and clearly enumerated, and the 
state-wide plan has been established through its SIGB, so, why not move ahead with 
overcoming the evident deficiencies? The fact is that there are several major external 
barriers standing in the way of correcting such deficiencies. Simply stated, irrespective of 
the existence of an agreed-upon plan in any given state, there can be key jurisdictions, 
which do not have the legal or jurisdictional authority or the financial wherewithal to 
proceed with the stated implementations, to say nothing of a particular locale’s 
recalcitrance to yield its unique status in this regard to some state-wide authority (Henry, 
2009). Added to that, in the situation in which a certain locale is unwilling to adapt itself 
to such authority, the governance authority may not have the legal right to compel it to do 
so (Henry, 2009). 
In spite of conventional training, first responders must also improvise their 
behaviors in disaster responses. In a study on improvised behavior, Mendonça, Webb, 
Butts, and Brooks (2014) claimed that responses to disaster are known to be conventional 
or improvised. However, Mendonça et al. statistically analyzed reports done by law 
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enforcement officers who responded to the Murrah Building bombing in Oklahoma City 
and the World Trade Center in the 911 attacks to explore their thinking processes behind 
their emergency responses. Careful coding by multiple researchers of the reports revealed 
that crises of large proportion can help researchers understand social structure. The 
narratives were classified and identified as behavior if the actions were related to disaster 
roles and cognitive if related to goal orientation, hypothesis, or observation. The study 
complemented and continued research that links disasters and the cognitive processes of 
first responders after training so that responses to such crises can be more deeply 
understood (Mendonça et al., 2014).  
Ristoska and Gjurov (2014) emphasized the importance of communication 
training from a well-educated and prepared emergency responder staff. To obtain the 
support of a regional or national population, responding institutions must not only 
communicate through the media but with the public. In the Republic of Macedonia, 
leaders initiated practical training through simulations and other exercises. These 
trainings are held in a regional training center established by the Department of Defense 
and since 2013 is known as the NATO Training Center for Public Relations. The goal is 
to develop different communication and public relations skills to meet various political 
crises and natural disasters (Ristoska & Gjurov, 2014; Stănescu, Boeriu, & Copotoiu, 
2016). 
Much can be learned from large scale emergencies, and first responders are 
willing to share what they did to aid in overcoming future disasters. Zane et al. (2012) 
reported on the most massive wildfire in Texas history and the largest destruction of 
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residences since 2007 on a national level. Their purpose was to share the experience so 
that future first responders could learn how to respond with minimum loss of property 
and lives. Ultimately, the disaster led to two deaths of civilians and 1,660 destroyed 
homes and took give weeks to contain. In the first part of the response period the Texas 
Department of State Health Services prioritized the most important problems that needed 
addressing, among them communication and emergency public information in addition to 
commanding and controlling the disaster, looking to the safety and health of first 
responders, providing them shelter, attempting to monitor behaviors regarding the 
disaster, surveillance and epidemiology, and disseminating and managing medical 
materials.  
 Regarding communication, the Department issued press releases statewide in two 
languages toward public health issues related to the wildfire including smoke precautions, 
how to evacuate and what to bring, and assessments of public health in the community. 
Locally, messages to communicate risk were updated via the media and people were 
directed to a conference center for messages that covered specific topics including the 
need to update tetanus shots and how to prevent injuries from the intense heat. Medical 
personnel staffed 24-hour hotlines. The wildfire started September 5, 2011 and was 
contained five weeks later in early October. Figure 4 shows the 5-week timeline of the 
disaster. Zane et al. (2012) concluded that first responders in most regions of the United 
States could benefit from learning about the strategies they used so that they could 
improve their own preparation and response to similar disasters. 
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Sunday, September 4 (wildfire started) 
 
Monday, September 5 
• State Medical Operations Center (SMOC) virtual activation 
• Deployed ambulance bus (ambus) 
 
Tuesday, September 6 (33,089 acres burned, ~ 500 homes destroyed, 0% contained) 
• Activated the SMOC 
• Issued statewide news releases on “Wildfire Evacuations: Here’s What to 
Bring” and “Wildfire Smoke Precautions” 
• Initiated epidemiology and surveillance activities 
• Monitored the status of nursing homes located in affected area to ensure any 
evacuations were adequately supported 
• Local Disaster Behavioral Health response activities began 
 
Wednesday, September 7 (~789 homes destroyed, 0% contained) 
• Deployed the Mobile Medical Team 
 
Thursday, September 8 (~1,386 homes destroyed, 30% contained) 
• Started delivering medical resources to local shelters 
 
Friday, September 9 (2 civilian deaths discovered) 
• Issued statewide news release on “Use Caution During Wildfire Recovery’ 
• Activated pharmacy contracts 
 
Sunday, September 11: (50% contained) 
• Demobilized ambus and assigned crew 
 
Tuesday, September 13 (~1554 homes destroyed, 70% contained) 
• Deactivated the SMOC 
• Wednesday, September 14  
• Demobilized the Mobile Medical Team 
 
Friday, September 23 
• Issued statewide news release on upcoming community health assessment in 
Bastrop County 
 
Saturday and Sunday, September 24 and 25 (95% contained) 
• Conducted public community health assessment 
 
Tuesday, October 9 (~1660 homes destroyed, 100% contained) 
 
 




On the state level, research has been conducted to develop a framework for 
improving awareness of emergency situations (Hunter, Yang, Petrie, & Aragón, 2012). 
Because disasters and emergencies can be so large in scale, public health professionals 
have seen a need for emergency preparedness exercises. Hunter et al. (2012) developed 
their study based on an epidemiological framework to conduct a survey to evaluate the 
capabilities of the emergency system in response to a crisis scenario and the challenges 
among organizations in managing information and organizing communications. The 
respondents came from 121 hospitals 24 EMS agencies, 35 health departments (local), 
and 5 regional disaster medical and health specialists and coordinators in the state of 
California (Hunter et al., 2012). Particularly significant were the number of responses in 
regard to communications systems and equipment that indicated partial or complete 
failure of the systems, which is the main problem in the present study (Hunter et al., 
2012). The researchers concluded that their results offered a beginning point for 
dialogues among emergency responders about their responsibilities, roles, and challenges 
regarding communications among various agencies and how to intervene to optimize 
communications interoperability. 
Qualitative Research on Emergency Communication 
Various qualitative peer-reviewed studies have been conducted in the emergency 
management field (Anthony et al., 2014; Broomé, 2013; Klappa et al., 2014; Yang et al., 
2010), though few have been conducted about lack of communication interoperability 
during a disaster. Anthony et al. (2014) investigated the system for hurricane warnings in 
a southwest state regarding the experiences of boundary spanners such as emergency 
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managers, weather personnel, and National Weather Service forecasters in in-depth 
interviews of almost 2 hours of 10 such people. Anthony et al. found that they were going 
after what seemed like conflicting goals. Consequently, the communication was 
“strained” (p. 468). These strains entailed the timing of the dissemination of information 
in contrast to access and accuracy of information as well as information attribution.  
Revere et al. (2015) explored communication technologies that are employed bi-
directionality between stakeholders and public health agencies as well as the use of 
texting from mobile phones to ensure that marginalized populations (geographically) 
could receive alerts. In a mixed methods approach through both surveys and interviews 
targeted to health agency workers, providers, and government personnel, the researchers 
asked respondents and participants how texting or a bidirectional system could perfect 
communications in emergencies with contrasts between local and national crises or 
pandemic and health updates. Revere et al. found email was favored for public health 
messages but for larger events the decision on what modality to use is complicated but 
must be managed well so everyone benefits. 
Broomé (2013) interviewed law enforcement officers regarding their 
psychological responses to pursuits, events that may be necessary in the case of terrorist 
attacks. Broomé found compared to an earlier study where attitudes ranged from 
overconfidence to impatience, that the officers had anxiety about performance once they 
realized their responsibility in the chase and focus on outcomes and consequences. These 
aspects can be like choking in sport performance; thus, to be competent first responders, 
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Broomé recommended that law enforcement consult with sports management 
organizations to enhance their psychological skills. 
Yang et al. (2010) interviewed nurses in China who were first responders (a role 
for which they were not fully trained) to an earthquake that took place in 2008. The 
purpose of the study was to explore their response to this disaster. They found the 
experience they went through overwhelming because they felt they were not trained to 
know exactly what to do. Yang et al. found that the three most significant reactions of the 
nurses was (a) strategies for coping and challenges, (b) relearning their role as caregivers 
and helpers, and (c) feelings of unpreparedness. The researchers highlighted using 
education and training specifically for disasters; otherwise, nurses would not be 
collaborative, efficient, productive, and stress-free. 
Summary 
 In this study, I take the position that there is a long-term solution to lack of 
interoperability in emergency communication: Training, budget and policy, properly 
conceived, put into effect and exercised in a combined and balanced effort are what is 
needed to fill in the missing elements leading to full radio interoperability in emergency 
situations and crises. The literature presented in Chapter 2 was based on the 
communication aspect of emergency management, in addition to how it is affected by 
public policy, training, and budget. Researchers have agreed that natural and human 
crises are rising at an alarming rate due to climate change and political instability 
(Barthel, 2011; Davis & Robbin, 2015; Sun et al., 2013; Stack, 2015). In a thorough 
review of the literature, lack of communications interoperability is prominent in all 
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studies whether due to incompatibility in training and equipment or from political 
interference (e.g., Fu et al., 2012; Henry, 2012; Huyck, 2015; Kożuch et al., 2015; 
McGee, 2012; Liotine et al., 2013; Mountjoy, 2005). As the result of lack of 
communication interoperability, many lives have been compromised or lost.  
Lack of radio interoperability is the most important issue, for that is the first line 
of communication for first responders battling a wildfire or monitoring civil unrest. 
However, when such lack of radio interoperability is the issue, policy makers, trainers, 
and communities put in their best efforts to overcome the crises with everything from 
balloons (Haque et al., 2012); satellite technology (Insinna, 2013); community 
preparedness (Hardie & Kitchen, 2014); to legislating better networks that ideally would 
ensure standardization of communications in emergency management such as P25 and 
IPAWS (Goldstein, 2013; Tuite, 2012). Currently, individuals have stronger networks 
than ever before in the history of humankind due primarily to social networking. Social 
networking has indeed helped save lives and institutions do use them as much as possible 
such as the widespread Amber Alerts on cellphones (Burtness & Ober, 2013; Wukich & 
Mergel, 2015). However, social networking and use of Broadband systems is not ideal for 
emergency managers due to the lack of security. Systems can be and have been hacked 
(McGee et al., 2012).  
The importance of radio interoperability in emergency situations and crises is 
crucial and well accepted as being essential to ensuring the well-being of first 
responders—even to the saving of their lives—as well as the well-being of those victims 
whose life and limb may be at risk. Various meanings have been attributed to the term 
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radio interoperability, but in the final analysis—in reality-- radio interoperability does not 
exist today, not in its unequivocal form of guaranteeing 100% reliable radio 
communications at every emergency site. This, unquestionably, is a serious problem, as 
witnessed in the summer of 2015 in the Wenachee WA fires in which 3 firefighters were 
trapped and killed (NASA, 2015; Zane et al., 2012). 
 Numerous solutions to the problem have been proposed. The federal government, 
for example, in recognition of the problem, has responded by establishing a line-up of 
federal agencies, all with the same underlying purpose of tackling the problem, but those 
efforts have been found to be limited in their effectiveness (Goldstein, 2013; Leiva, 
2014). More recently, however, the idea has emerged that training, effective budgets, and 
updated policies may hold the key to a viable solution. These approaches are directly in 
line with the thesis of this dissertation which posits that regular, well-planned training 
and training exercises, well-conceived and well-coordinated expenditures on compatible 
forms of equipment and sound training and sound, broad-based and well-devised federal, 
state and local policies hold the ultimate answer to achieving reliable radio 
interoperability in all types of emergency situations and crises. 
Conclusions 
This study posited that the elements of training, budget and policy, properly 
constituted and followed through with, are key elements in establishing radio 
interoperability in emergency situations and crises, and that there is an abundance of 
articles in support of that position. In researching the literature, abundant support with 
regard to the validation of those issues is also found. I have advanced the position that 
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training, budget and policies, properly formulated and supported and adequately 
promulgated will satisfy most, if not all, of the requisites for achieving the stated goal. 
The research in support of these premises are derived from information and data collected 
from first-hand interviews with experienced first responders to emergency situations who 
work in either a large city, a small towns, or a rural community in California, Texas, and 
New York. Chapter 3 presents the qualitative methodology with which I conducted the 
study as well as the research goals and procedures used to collect and analyze the data. 
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
In the preceding chapter, I posited that training, budget, and policy have an 
integral relationship with communications interoperability and, by extension, unfettered 
emergency-site communications. In Chapter 3, the method is presented for gathering and 
analyzing data from interviews conducted with experienced first responders from the 
states of California, Texas, and New York. The aim of this study was to gain an overview 
of the current difficulties experienced by firefighters and law enforcement personnel in 
those states in quelling emergency situations and how their efforts have been impeded, or 
completely thwarted, by the lack of communication interoperability. This chapter sets out 
the methods to be used in this undertaking: the goals of the research and the detailed 
procedures to be followed in the collection of information and data. Additionally, 
informed consent and ethical considerations for the participants are elaborated on within 
this chapter. 
Research Design and Rationale 
The research questions in the study were as follows: 
1. How do first responders describe their experiences in emergency situations 
that involve lack of communication interoperability? 
2. What is the role of budget and training in connection with communication 
interoperability and the policies that might be instituted to improve the safety 
of emergency responders? 
I reviewed different methods for my study. The main research methodologies are 
quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods. Quantitative research is mostly statistical, 
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and researchers use instruments that are largely predetermined or developed and tested 
with the goal of seeking correlations among variables or testing hypotheses (Wahyuni, 
2012; Yin, 2014). This kind of research is objective and can eliminate bias; mixed 
methods are a combination of qualitative and quantitative research (e.g., conducting a 
survey and recruiting some of the respondents for in-depth interviews). I did not plan to 
find correlations or cultivate hypotheses, but instead explored first responders’ 
experience with the lack of communications interoperability as well as the role of budget, 
training, and policy in emergency preparedness.  
Qualitative research involves the collection of rich experiential data through 
interviews, document review and observations – narrative rather than numerical data 
(McCusker & Gunaydin, 2015; Yin, 2014). These kinds of data can reveal the social 
motivation of individuals as well as their lived experiences in natural settings. In 
qualitative studies, the researcher is obligated to maintain an ethical attitude toward the 
participants and confidentiality (Damianakis & Woodford, 2012). A variety of qualitative 
traditions are ethnography, grounded theory, case study, and narrative inquiry along with 
phenomenology (Yin, 2014).  
Case study can consist of not only interviews, but also observations and document 
review and is used to explore the perspectives of the participants regarding events, 
activities, and bounded programs (Yin, 2014). Because the study involved the actual 
experiences of what resulted in breakdown of communications interoperability, rather 
than on general points-of-view on disasters, case study did not fit the study. Grounded 
theory is a way by which researchers can analyze unexplained phenomena, name 
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integrated concepts, and build theories from qualitative data (Foley & Timonen, 2015). 
Because I was using three out of many communication theories that already exist to guide 
the study, there was no need to construct a new theory on lack of communications 
interoperability.  
Narrative inquiry is also used to develop theories regarding “psychological and 
social process” (Lal et al., 2012, p. 6), and as stated, no need existed to construct new 
theories for the study. Lastly, ethnography involves studying groups of people over time 
in their natural settings, and how they participate in that setting (Petty et al., 2012). The 
basic qualitative interviews for the study were relatively short in duration, and the 
participants were not being observed in their workplace or an actual event in which they 
were in the role of first responders, but rather how these first responders recalled 
experiences they have already had. The kind of qualitative research that best fit the study 
was a detailed exploration of the participants’ experiences regarding communications 
interoperability during crises; thus, a basic qualitative study was the best choice. 
Role of the Researcher 
Snodgrass (2014) noted that the qualitative researcher can interpret the data to 
understand how the participants can make sense of a phenomenon they have experienced. 
As a current first responder with over 25 years’ experience in emergency mitigation, I 
was confident I would be able to extract the broad-based data from the cases studied and 
make detailed analyses to derive cogent appraisals of the data. Furthermore, my personal 
experiences as a first responder aided in substantiating the credibility of my results. 
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My background and personal experience with emergency situations have enabled 
me to understand the vernacular of the participants and the descriptive verbiage typically 
utilized in after-action reports. Based on my personal experiences as a first responder, it 
has become clear to me that the elements of training, budget, and policy can either 
support or corrupt an emergency situation, with the latter having a knock-on effect of 
negatively impacting communications interoperability. The participants for the study, 
however, were not personally known to me or supervised by me. Nevertheless, my long-
time perspectives as a first responder might have led to bias towards their situation, for I 
have been in many emergency situations as a former first responder. Still, in my role as 
the researcher, I followed ethical guidelines, including member checking as well as any 
needed follow-ups on the interviews to prevent subjectivity in this area in which I have 
had extensive experience (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011; Hofmeyer et al., 2012; Yin, 2014). 
Methodology 
The qualitative method of research was selected as the most appropriate approach 
in this study, for it involves exploring and understanding the personal experiences of first 
responders who have faced life-threatening situations when lack of communications 
interoperability was a significant factor in their effectiveness. A basic qualitative design 
in particular is the best tradition for the present study because it is used to understand 
what an experience means in the context of those who lived it, the essence of an 
individual lived experience (Petty et al., 2012). In qualitative research, the researcher 
focuses on persons currently involved in the kinds of situations being studied and records 
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their experiences in a common frame of reference. The goal of this research is to develop 
rich, in-depth data from the participants.  
Participant Selection Logic 
The sample of 18 interviewees was drawn from a national representative 
population of emergency first responders. Interviewees for this study were drawn from 
six fire and law-enforcement departments in three different states: California, Texas, and 
New York. These three states were selected for two reasons: the first is that these states 
are the most populated ones in the nation. The second involves the states’ disparate 
geographic locations, urban and rural. The variable aspects of the cities and towns 
selected were designed to determine (a) how population size or location affects the ways 
in which communications interoperability may vary from location to location, and (b) 
how each locale has organized its training procedures, budget considerations, and policies 
to provide and support communications interoperability in emergency situations. The 
prospective participants were either currently working or recently retired in the role of a 
first responder. Moreover, the participants selected had to have a minimum of 10 years of 
service in responding to emergency situations. This criterion was deemed as being 
necessary for the participant to have a sufficient amount of work-related experience with 
communications interoperability.  
The data collected from the sample population were used to develop themes about 
the lived experiences of the emergency responders. It would have been difficult and 
costly to collect data from an entire population of law enforcement personnel and 
firefighters in the United States; therefore, the rationale discussed previously for the three 
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states and participants involved in the study can be justified. Frankfort-Nachmias (2008) 
stated, “Methodologically speaking, a population is the aggregate of all cases that 
conform to some designated set of specifications” (p. 79). The sample population 
provided a wide variety of experiences for both firefighters and law enforcement officers 
in rural, urban, and small town jurisdictions. 
The sample population should be a realistic and accurate representation of the 
population for the study to be reliable (Yin, 2014), and in this instance it certainly kept 
the research more reasonable and affordable. Once I received permission to recruit 
participants and receive responses, I sent out information involving anonymity and 
confidentiality and details about how the participant would receive a survey via his or he 
personal email. This survey was completed by the participant and then returned via email 
to me. If a survey was returned incomplete, or if I deemed follow-up information was 
needed, I arranged for individual phone interviews for additional clarification that would 
span anywhere between 15 and 30 minutes.  
If the initial contact letter did not generate the numbers I sought to continue with 
this study, I made additional attempts to recruit participants for the study by contacting 
additional first responders. However, I did not anticipate having issues getting a sufficient 
number of participants, for many first responders have expressed frustration about the 
lack of communication interoperability in crisis events and wanted to share their 
experiences (Kehl et al., 2014; Verkuil & Fountain, 2014). Still, if that was not the case, 
and fewer people volunteered, I planned to implement snowball sampling, where those 
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who committed to be interviewed were asked to recommend others in firefighting or law 
enforcement for additional interviews (Atkinson & Flint, 2001). 
Instrumentation 
As a researcher in a qualitative study, I was the primary instrument in gathering 
data (Yin, 2014), which were the results of in-depth semistructured surveys of 18 
participants from the states of California, New York, and Texas. The participants were 
comprised of one firefighter and one law enforcement official from an agency that serves 
a large population, one of each from a small agency such as a volunteer firefighting 
agency or law enforcement agency of fewer than 25 sworn personnel, and one of each 
from a rural agency with a large land base and small population. During the interviews, I 
took handwritten notes and used bracketing to avoid bias.  
Chan, Fung, and Chien (2013) noted that gaining in-depth understanding of the 
participants’ experiences is the most important goal. Still, researchers are human, which 
surely influences research. Thus, researchers should bracket their own experience with 
the aim of minimizing their influence, including assessing mentally one’s own 
personality and keeping a reflexive diary (Chan et al., 2013). After a professional 
transcriber transformed the recordings into Word files, I allowed the participants to 
review the transcripts to make their accuracy certain prior to analyzing the data for 
emerging themes regarding budget, training, and policy as they related to lack of 
communication interoperability for first responders during a disaster or emergency.  
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Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection 
A general overview of the study was e-mailed to the administrators of each fire 
and law enforcement agencies. The e-mail solicited their approval to collect data from 
their staff, and to speak with the various staff members meeting the criteria stated in 
previous sections of this chapter with the goal of selecting one participant from each 
agency to interview. The e-mail was then followed up with a survey sent, again, via e-
mail to each participant. If needed, I planned to phone interview participants who could 
provide additional responses to their initial reply. In the phone call, if needed, the 
participant would be provided language with a stated understanding that the goal of the 
study is to explore how budget, training, and policy impact communication 
interoperability for first responders in an emergency situation.  
Once the potential participants were identified, I sent an e-mail to each of them 
via their personal e-mail addresses, introducing myself and explaining the nature of the 
study. I also delineated their options at any time to withdraw from the study and their 
participation, or lack thereof, to the study would have no bearing on any workplace 
evaluations, promotions, or demotions, and that their responses would remain anonymous 
to their colleagues and supervisors. Once the interviewees agreed to the interview, a copy 
of the informed consent form was submitted via e-mail to the respective participants. 
When the informed consent form was returned to me via e-mail, I followed up with the 
participant in an e-mail for the participant to complete the survey. Again, if needed, the 
one-to-one phone interview questions were intended to be open-ended for the first 
responders to elaborate on their experiences in various emergency situations. The focus 
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of this methodology was to report the experiences of the lack of interoperability and how 
these experiences of can be aligned to budget, training, and policy within the 
aforementioned fire and law enforcement agencies within the cities being studied. 
Surveys sent via a personal e-mail offered a low-cost way of gaining access to 
respondents’ input that might otherwise be difficult to secure in person, due to the 
widespread distances involved. One clear disadvantage of an e-mailed survey, however, 
is the reduced amount of nonverbal interaction with the respondents. Because I was not 
able to observe the facial expressions, body language, and other physical cues of the 
respondents, I had to rely on my own experience as a first responder to discern the level 
of frankness and veracity, which is basic to a qualitative study, for such an approach 
allows and encourages direct interaction with the subject. In the process, I was confident 
that my more than 25 years of experience as a first responder would enable me to 
engender a sense of comradeship with the respondents, encouraging them to open up to 
the questions posed and to be forthright in the answers delivered (Opdenakker, 2006). 
Prior to beginning the e-mailed survey, I restated, in writing on the opening page of the e-
mail, the aim and conditions of the study and asked if the participants still wished to 
continue with the study.  
The survey was conducted in a semistructured fashion (Yin, 2014). Each 
participant was asked a number of open-ended questions. The questions were the same 
for all the participants at the outset, but, because the sessions were intended to be free-
flowing, different responses emerged, which could have extended the time of the 
interview to a greater or lesser extent. Additionally, the semistructured format allowed 
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participants to freely discuss how their lived experiences on training, budget, and policy 
affected radio interoperability, or the lack thereof. The survey took each participant no 
more than 45 minutes to complete and, if deemed appropriate for my study, a follow up 
phone call was made to various participants whose initial replies needed more 
clarification. This follow-up phone interview lasted no more than 30 minutes. Listed next 
is the initial survey that was mailed to each participant:   
1. Please share a lived experience in which radio intercommunications were 
compromised. 
2. Can you explain the internal operations of how communications are relayed during 
an emergency? 
3. To what extent do you believe a nationwide communication system would lessen 
errors in an emergency response? 
4. In your experience, do you believe you have adequate training on the use of radio 
operability?  If not, what can be improved? 
5. In your experience, do you believe your respective agency (i.e., police or fire 
department) has adequate radio communications equipment for their first 
responders? 
6. Have you ever experienced a situation as a first responder in which radio equipment 
simply did not work? 
a. Would you describe the nature of that situation regarding the 
equipment: was it operator error or something else? 
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7. Thinking about your current work setting, do you believe there is adequate 
communication regarding the policy surrounding radio interoperability? 
a. Do you think this policy can be improved? 
b. Why or why not? 
c. How so? (if, yes) 
8. How long have you worked in the state of ____ (either California, Texas, New 
York) as a first responder?  
a. If you have worked in another state in this same capacity, were there 
similar issues regarding radio interoperability? 
b. Can you share an example of those similarities? 
c. Was your previous location larger or smaller in employee size compared 
to where you are now or your most recent experience as a first responder? 
9. What is it like when you’re in an emergency situation responding to a scene and 
you experienced either a failed or faulty situation regarding radio interoperability? 
10.  Can you share with me how was the foregoing situation was resolved? 
11.  In your experience as a first responder, what stands out most regarding lack of 
communication interoperability? 
12.  Is there anything you would like to add that you feel we have not covered? 
To remain in alignment with the research questions and subtopics of budget, training, 
policy, and equipment as related to radio interoperability, each of the above questions 
related to the overall study. Specifically, Questions 1, 5, 7b, 8a, 8c, and 9 related to the 
area of budgeting within a given agency. Questions 4 and 6 related to equipment. 
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Questions 2, 3, 6a, 7, 7a, 7b, 7c, 8a, 8c, 9, and 10 had the themes of policy. Questions 4, 
7b, 8a, 8c, and 9 related to training. Several questions that were asked were indicative of 
more than one theme and were aligned and mentioned as such. Finally, Questions 11 and 
12 were the most open-ended; therefore, they could be interpreted in all four themes of 
budget, equipment, policy, and training. 
For those participants I contacted for a follow-up phone interview, I notified each 
interviewee when the audio portion of the interview was being recorded and when the 
audio recording ended. I also took handwritten notes to augment the recordings to be 
used to prevent bias and to aid in data analysis (Yin, 2014). The handwritten notes 
augmented the recording of the interview and further instituted privacy and general 
interview compliance best-practices. The note taking process was also in accordance with 
the qualitative method of case study design for it allowed me to obtain rich data as 
experienced by the participants in the study (Yin, 2014). Participants were informed that 
they could exit the interview at any time with no questions asked and no obligation to 
provide any further information. At the end of the interview, the participants were 
encouraged to add any information they felt had been left out of the interview questions. 
The interview session ended with a statement of appreciation for the participant’s 
time and a reminder of the two-step follow-up process and options for not participating, if 
the participant decided otherwise at that juncture. During the next three days following 
each returned survey and phone interview, I organized my interview notes. The digital 
recordings could be sent via email to a professional transcriptionist who signed a 
confidentiality agreement to transcribe the interviews with transcription software.  
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The first follow-up step was an opportunity for me to review the transcribed 
interviews for accuracy. I sent the transcriptions to the interviewees via personal email 
for them to check for accuracy and completeness. The second follow-up step was the 
option to receive a copy of the completed dissertation. After two more days, I followed 
up with a phone call to determine if the transcription accurately reflected the 
interviewee’s responses and if any revisions were needed.  
By implementing end-use strategizing, I was able to visualize how this study 
could be applied to firefighters and police officers in the respective states who 
participated in this study. Moreover, end-use strategizing also allowed me to 
conceptualize immediate implications of this study—that are further addressed in the 
forthcoming chapters—and how the comments from the participants can be generalized 
to other disciplines within emergency management. For the purposes of replication and 
duplication of my study by other researchers, my steps were as follows: 
1. A general search was conducted to determine the three most populated states in 
the nation.  
2. After those states (California, Texas, and New York) were identified, I then 
searched for three locations within each state of being a large-sized city, a mid-
sized town, and a rural community all within each respective state for a total of 
nine locations within the United States. 
3. Once these locations were determined, I researched these areas to confirm each 
large sized city, mid-sized town, and rural community contained both a fire 
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company and a police station. Both of these entities might not always exist, 
especially in rural communities. 
4. Upon verification of these states and communities having the needed disciplines, I 
was able to contact Mr. Dixon Robin, National Response Team Leader 
(supervisor) Emergency Response, who was able to provide me with a list of 73 
firefighters and police officers who had at least 10 years of service as an 
emergency responder in either the discipline of being a firefighter or a law 
enforcement officer. 
5. Because Agent Robin has coordinated teams of emergency responders across the 
United States, he had access and working knowledge of emergency responders 
from various disciplines. This list was sent to me via my personal email. 
6. All 73 people on the list provided by Team leader Robins were contacted via 
email by the researcher and were given the appropriate Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) documents for review and consent. 
7. As consent letters were returned, I then sent each participant the survey via their 
personal email.  
8. When participants emailed me stating they were unable to complete the survey 
due to time constraints, but still wanted to participant in the survey, I asked them, 
via email, if we could arrange a time convenient for them so that I may call them 
and obtain their responses during either a face-to-face or telephone interview. 
9. Once I received 23 consents, I terminated collecting and soliciting any further 
responses, for I was only seeking 18 participants. An additional five consents 
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were collected in case one or two of the original 18 participants decided to 
withdraw from the study. 
10. For those participants who went sent the survey via their personal email, they 
were given one week to complete the questions and return it to my personal email. 
11. For those participants I either met face-to-face or spoke to over the telephone to 
obtain their responses, I recorded, with their permission, the responses to each 
question.  
12. In these calls or the face-to-face meetings, I asked the participant to have in front 
of him or her a copy of the survey and before we began the interviews, based on 
the surveys from the survey, I reminded the participants of the IRB consent and 
their right to terminate the conversation at any time during the interview. 
13. I, then, began to record the interview and started with question number one. 
14. I took notes to what the participant stated during the interview and, again, the 
entire interview was recorded. 
15. This process continued for each of the remaining questions on the survey. 
16. When all questions were answered, I thanked the participant for his/her time and 
transcribed the entire interview from the recording device. 
17. Upon transcribing the interview, and along with the returned written responses 
from the participants, I searched for themes and ideas that were derived from the 
data. 
18. The major themes that emerged from the data were inconsistencies relating to 
budget, policy, training, and interoperability. 
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Data Analysis Plan 
Due to the small number of 18 participants interviewed for this study, I decided 
upon hand coding as the best method to analyze the data. As the primary and sole 
researcher for this study, hand coding allowed me to consider themes the participants 
discussed, to hear intonations in the participant’s telling of incidents, and to understand 
how the expression of these themes created a situation of danger, confusion, and pure 
lack of interoperability for emergency responders. Hand coding allowed me, as the 
primary researcher, to determine which words, phrases, themes, were communicated the 
most. Furthermore, hand coding allowed me to organically develop the ideas generated 
by the participants and natural, logical themes manifested from the hand coding method.  
The survey data were coded using the participant’s words and themes first, 
followed by thematic code names represented in the literature corresponding to this basic 
qualitative study (Yin, 2014). When all the surveys and interviews were transcribed and 
reviewed, I looked for categories and themes that emerged through the responses of the 
participants obtained with manual coding of key phrases that stood out. Such a strategy 
helped with organizing content, coding, and identifying themes to gain more in-depth 
exploration of the experiences of first responders who have had issues regarding lack of 
communication interoperability. To further demonstrate alignment between the research 
framework and research methodology, I extracted particular themes, statements or data as 
given by the participants from within the study and compare it with all other themes, 
comments, and data that may have been similar or different to develop conceptualizations 
of the possible relations between various pieces of data. 
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Soon, a pre-set list of four codes became apparent: budget, training, policy, and 
interoperability. As the researcher, I also created a code book in which one definition was 
created based upon the compilation of these words from the participants during the 
interviews. I, as the researcher, could then begin to formulate questions such as: How is 
the lack of radio interoperability experienced differently for those first responders who 
work in California as opposed to those first responders who work in Texas and New 
York? As with most qualitative studies, this study was intended to generate knowledge 
about common patterns and themes within human experience. The specificity regarding 
this study, though, focused on the lack of communication interoperability as seen through 
the lens of training, budget, and policy. I was attempting to determine to what extent 
budget, training, and policy create interoperability, or a lack thereof, for an emergency 
responder within the three most populated states in the United States. The emergency 
responders were limited to the disciplines of firefighting and law enforcement within 
either a big city, a small -sized town, or a rural setting with a minimum of 10 years within 
the respective discipline.  
Issues of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
First, member checking can also enhance credibility and I shared the transcribed 
interview to make certain the all of the participants confirmed the accuracy of their words 
and individual perceptions. If any of the participants’ objected to the accuracy, they could 
help to provide better wording. Second, if participants did not offer detailed answers, 
using follow up probes helped to verify what they meant to say such as “May I have an 
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example of a training protocol?” or “I need a bit more clarification on the strategy you 
used.”  
Transferability 
Transferability, or external validity, can be established by eliciting thick 
descriptions of lack of communication interoperability during disasters and seeking 
variation in participant selection. For these reasons, participants were drawn from three 
states spread far across the country from two different kinds of first responders (law 
enforcers and firefighters) in three types of settings (an agency that serves a large 
population, a small agency of fewer than 25 sworn personnel, and a rural agency with a 
large land base and small population). 
Dependability and Confirmability 
I planned to employ a reflexive analytical strategy to enhance dependability and 
confirmability, which acted as my personal assessment of what I perceived during the 
interviews. Note taking by hand in a journal helped track the daily activities and methods 
used as well as bracketing to minimize bias (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In the journal, I 
noted carefully any ideas, thoughts, or personal attitudes during the semistructured 
interviews.  
Ethical Procedures 
The participants were asked to sign informed consent forms in pursuance to their 
agreement to participate. To maintain the integrity of the data, a password-protected 
external hard drive was used to transfer all data initially collected from my desk-top 
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computer. The external hard drive was password protected that only I, as the primary 
researcher, would have access to throughout the duration of the study.  
An informed consent form initially was distributed via email to each participant in 
the study. If participants agreed to participate in the study, the form was returned and an 
electronic signature was accepted. I enforced the specified wait period as described in the 
earlier section of this chapter regarding data collection. These procedures were in full 
alignment of the researcher obtaining consent for each participant in the study. The 
participant had to review, sign, and verbally acknowledge her/his understanding of the 
depth and breadth of the questions before any portion of the interview commenced and 
data were collected (Creswell, 2009).  
Participants were informed in writing, through their informed consent forms, and 
again, verbally, prior to the beginning of the phone interviews, that their identities, 
linking any of them to any particular responses, were not to be communicated to any 
organization, publication or person, nor would any incentives or penalties that might 
affect their positions be attributed to their answers. In addition, every effort was made to 
ensure that the participants understood the intent of the study and their role in collecting 
the data and that their responses were only be used in the context of this dissertation. 
They were further informed that they could terminate the interview at any time or retract 
any or all of their responses. 
Furthermore, all materials, including informed consent forms, phone interview 
notes, phone interview transcriptions, and any and all electronic communications are to 
be retained by me under lock and key for 5 years following the final acceptance of this 
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dissertation by the university. At that time, all materials are to be properly and thoroughly 
disposed of.  
Finally, I did not conduct the study in my own work environment with coworkers 
or anyone else known to me; therefore, there was no conflict of interest or difference in 
levels of power, in which case the interviewers might not be entirely forthcoming with 
their experiences as first responders during disasters. 
Summary 
This chapter outlined the methodology of my study. Specifically, I discussed why 
a qualitative approach was the best method of choice for my research and provided a 
clear justification for this method. Additionally, I detailed why this study followed a 
basic qualitative procedure and how my data collection procedures aligned it to such a 
tradition. This chapter should support and provide confidence of the level of rigor and 
reliability needed for the topic of lack of interoperability and how the concept of the lack 
of it was also dependent on training, budget, and policy. Additionally, in this chapter, I 
provided a discussion on who would participate in the study, the rationale for the selected 





Chapter 4: Results  
The purpose of this study was to explore and understand from the perspectives of 
first responders how they ensure their own safety and that of others during an emergency 
situation. The basic qualitative study was based on their reliance on radio 
communications interoperability whether over a network or directly between emergency 
responders. Dependable communications are intrinsically connected to budget, policy, 
and training in the context of the present study. The research questions that guided the 
study are the following: 
1. How do first responders describe their experiences in emergency situations 
that involve lack of communication interoperability? 
2. What is the role of budget and training in connection with communication 
interoperability and the policies that might be instituted to improve the safety 
of emergency responders? 
Chapter 4 is organized into the following sections: (a) research setting that sheds 
light on anything that can influence the findings; (b) demographics to explain the 
participants’ professional backgrounds as well as the settings in which they work (e.g., 
rural law enforcement agency in Texas, urban firefighting department in New York); (c) 
how the data were collected; (d) how the data were analyzed; (e) evidence of 
trustworthiness including credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability; (f) 
detailed presentation of the findings; and (g) a summary of how the research questions 





Data were collected from the 18 participants through in-depth semistructured 
telephone interviews in a quiet location of their choice, but not at their place of 
employment. Thirteen of the participants were interviewed telephonically; three face to 
face, and two via e-mail. The participants came from the states of California, New York, 
and Texas. Many of them were coping with budget cuts and lack of training and effective 
policies, yet such circumstances made them very motivated to engage in the research and 
share their information. Participants were comprised of one law enforcement official and 
one firefighter from a big city, a small town with fewer than 25 first responders and a 
rural agency with a small population yet with a large land base in each state.  
During the interviews, none of the participants disclosed any current personal or 
organizational conditions that would have influenced their experience at the time of the 
study that could impact the research results. One female participant disclosed she worked 
a fire scene approximately a year ago, which was traumatic for her shortly after the 
incident, but based on observations, she did not indicate any emotional behavior such as 
crying, or sudden change of vocal intonation or vocal expression during the interview 
regarding the explanation of this event. Moreover, the participant remained neutral in 
tone and moved on to the next question without incident. I did take handwritten notes 
along with bracketing to minimize bias. 
Demographics 
The participants represented a diverse sample of first responders across the three 
most populous areas of the United States (see Table 1). The participants were further 
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broken down to determine the frequency with which each respondent stated something 
negative or of concern regarding their respective agency in terms of budget, training, 
policy, and interoperability. These terms are identified in Table 1 as B (budget), T 
(training), P (policy), and I (interoperability). These responses were generated from the 
survey questions and while some of the responses from the participants were directly 
mentioned as either being of concern in some capacity, others responded as having 
concerns in the themes of budget, training, policy, or overall interoperability.  
Participants were of both genders, from different ethnic backgrounds, from either 
the firefighting or law enforcement agencies, and with varying years of service ranging 
from 10 to 30 years. Participants were numbered in the order in which their surveys were 
returned to my personal email or conducted to me. Because the participants were clear in 
their views about this issue, there was very little to insinuate from the data, for their 
responses were specific and direct about these concerns. Specifically, there were 18 
respondents. Each participant responded to 12 main questions. All participants responded 
to all 12 questions so three was a total of 216 responses for the entire survey. Of the 216 
responses, nine responses had a negative remark regarding budget. Specifically, these 
participants mentioned issues stemming from a lack of budget, budget cuts, or inequities 






Name                          




Interview Method        B  |  T  |  P  |  I 
P1 33 Caucasian Female Firefighter     NY Small town 10 Face to Face                 2     4     6     8 
P2 41 African American Male Law enforcement TX Large city 16 Telephonically             0     1     1     0 
P3 51 Asian Male Firefighter TX Large city 10 Telephonically             0     8     1     0 
P4 40 Caucasian Male Law enforcement CA Rural 18 Telephonically             0     4     3     2 
P5 45 African American Male Firefighter NY Large city 25 Telephonically             0     3     2     0 
P6 39 Caucasian Male Law enforcement NY Rural 12 Telephonically             0     0     0     0 
P7 36 Caucasian Male Firefighter TX Rural 15 Telephonically             0     9     0     0 
P8 31 Caucasian Male Firefighter TX Small town 12 Email                           4     0     1     0 
P9 33 Caucasian Male Law enforcement           CA Small town 13 Telephonically             1     5     2     0 
P10 42 Latino Female Law enforcement CA Large city 20 Telephonically             0     0     6     0 
P11 43 Caucasian Male Firefighter NY Rural 21 Telephonically             0     1     2     0 
P12 33 Caucasian Male Firefighter CA Large city 12 Telephonically             1     2     1     0 
P13 31 Caucasian Male Law enforcement TX Rural 10.5 Email                           0     0     0     2 
P14 32 Caucasian Male Firefighter CA Rural 10 Telephonically             0     0     1     0 
P15 35 Caucasian Female Law enforcement  TX Small town 13 Telephonically             0     0     1     0 
P16 37 Caucasian Male Firefighter CA Small town 15 Telephonically             1     0     0     0 
P17 52 African American Male Law enforcement NY Large city 30 Face to Face                 0     1     1     0 
P18 38 Caucasian Male Law enforcement NY Small town 14  Face to face                  0     2     2     0 
                                              9   40   30   12 
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Regarding training and concerns, the 18 participants mentioned training issues, 
either as being infrequent, nonexistent, or inadequate to their needs of their job 40 times 
in the overall survey. Policy was a concern and mentioned as such 30 times within the 18 
respondents. Issues regarding policy were based on not knowing what the policy was or if 
the policy was still effective; or still appropriate to the needs of their respective 
departments. Finally, of the 18 participants, the overall sense of the lack of 
interoperability; or simply not communicating the needs of the supervisors to the 
emergency responders or the emergency responder not being able to fully communicate 
their own needs in an emergency situation, was discussed 12 times in the survey.  
Data Collection 
Eighteen participants took part in the interviews. Nine of the participants were 
firefighters and nine were law enforcement officers. Three of the participants were 
female and 15 were male. Four had more than 20 years of service. Ethnically, 13 of 18 
were Caucasian, three African American, one Latino, and one Asian. Three participants 
were interviewed face to face, 13 telephonically, and two via e-mail. 
The data collection process took place over a 4-week period. The data were 
recorded not only on participant surveys. The face-to-face and telephonic interviews were 
recorded and transcribed before they were analyzed for themes. The two people who 
responded by email did so via an encrypted email to an off-site secure separate email 
account. I was able to get everything needed with their responses, so no additional 
follow-up was needed. Each participant was contacted once. The participants, all law 
enforcement and firefighters, had varying experiences yet all of their responses were 
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related to the research questions. Consequently, nothing was discrepant in the data from 
the participants who were from multiple races, genders, and varying locations from the 
previously indicated states.  
I recorded both the telephonic and face-to-face interviews on a Sony recorder with 
transcription software on speakerphone. The interviews were conducted in a neutral 
location, mutually agreeable to both the interviewer and participant, but additionally, not 
influenced by work environment on either side. They took place outside of work hours 
and on a personal line. Due to the security of the emails, there were no issues with email 
open-ended survey questions and written interviews. Regarding the two written 
interviews, the participants’ location prohibited face-to-face data collection. Although 
telephonic interviews would have been the chosen method, their work schedule 
prohibited such a format.  
Data Analysis 
Participants were coded in the order in which they responded. There were 18 
participants, thus, the codes were established as P1, P2, through P18. The data were 
hand-coded on an Excel sheet. The data can be divided into two categories and two 
subcategories determined by the research questions. The single, unifying word iterated or 
analyzed in the participant data was interoperability. Interoperability, or the lack thereof, 
impacts to what extent an emergency responder can communicate with other first 
responders (Huyck, 2013). When interoperability is compromised, it becomes 
challenging for the emergency responder to complete the task at hand. The second main 
theme encompassing was the theme of budget. The third main theme encompassing 
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theme on the graph was policy. The final main theme of this graph was training (see 
Table 2 for a visual presentation of the themes and subthemes in the study). 
Table 2 
Themes and Subthemes 
Budget Training Policy Interoperability 
Equipment 
Update Delays  
Due to 
Emergency 
Budget Priorities  
Need for Plain 
Talk Instead  
of 10-Code and 
Signals 
Dependency on Own 
Dispatch in Lieu of 
Interoperability With 




Costs Lives  
Lack of Money 
in Small Towns 















Lack of Training 
Can Result in 
Liability Issues  
Need for Coordination 
of Training with 
 New Equipment and 
Policies  
Having to Resort to 
Personal and 
Others’ Cellphones  
 
Lack of Training Can Result in Injuries and 
Loss of Life 
Difficulty 
Communicating in 




 New Equipment 
and Policies  
 
Large Land Mass in 
Rural Areas with 
Sporadic Coverage  









I used a basic diagram depicting interoperability as the crux of the study, for 
without interoperability, emergency responders would be unable—and have been 
unable—to do their job according to the data analyzed from the participants. When there 
is a lack of interoperability, other crucial factors identified through the literature and in 
my framework as being budget, training, and policy, as well as themes discussed in the 
participant replies, suggested these three themes as being dependent, yet fluid to 
interoperability (Huyct, 2013). Specifically, interoperability serves as the end-all, be-all 
to an emergency responder. All of those surveyed stated in some fashion that 
interoperability was the single-most important need to save lives: albeit someone else’s or 
their own.  
The next critical word, as identified by the participants and their use of terms, 
situations, and experiences is that of budget. Without budget, there are not enough 
financial resources to uphold the need of interoperability. A healthy budget allows for 
emergency responders to impact policy that drives the purchases and training for 
emergency responders. Ninety percent of the participants acknowledged, in some form, 
that budget was a critical element for their own role as an emergency responder and the 
role of their individual department.  
Within the main theme of budget, there were multiple subthemes that were noted 
as discrepancies within the issue of budget. These discrepancies varied from large city to 
the rural town and also varied from state; there were three subthemes that emerged from 
the data. These subthemes were (a) not having an appropriate budget to update the 
necessary equipment used by first responders and (b) no allotted of funds for emergency 
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responders to attend training, specifically on the integration of plain talk instead of a 10-
code and signal system. While emergency responders understood the inequities of a 
budget between a large city and a rural town, 42% of those responded they were unclear 
as to why a small town and a rural community would have considerable disparities in 
budget. Of these 45% who stated this comment, more than half worked at some point in 
their careers as an emergency responder in both a small town and a rural community. 
The third most critical word as reported by the participant’s survey in this study 
was policy. However, it needs to be noted that effective policy is the key. Policy, for the 
sake of policy will not allow for emergency responders to complete their job. Policy, like 
budget, is created for the betterment of the responders. But, the concern of the 
participants, specifically, 27% of them, was that policy needed to be communicated. So 
this becomes an issue of interoperability, as well. While all of the emergency responders 
stated their unit had a policy in place for radio communications such as  when to use 
them, how to use them, and who is to use them, 45% of these respondents stated these 
policies were learned on-the-job, or through colleagues who were later reprimanded for 
improper communication use. Therefore, it can be concluded that the policy may be 
denoted as a task list item, for the actual discussion appears to be lacking within many of 
these individual organizations. 
The fourth most critical word as reported by the participants in this study was 
training. While all of the participants stated they received initial training to complete their 
duties as emergency responders, nearly 50% of those participants stated they had not 
received any ongoing professional development on the equipment since their initial 
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training. This is a problematic situation, for technology changes, skills change, the needs 
of a given community change, yet the training received from half of these emergency 
responders was more than 10 years old. The added problem here is that policy may not 
dictate any affirmations of updating the training, or there might not be appropriate 
budgeting to make it happen. Either way, this situation fosters an environment to poor 
interoperability. 
Within training, there were four subthemes that emerged from the participant 
replies either directly stated on their survey or discussed in their phone interview. 
Research Question 1 addressed the lack of communications interoperability. Several 
subthemes arose related to this research question and the issues involved. Study Results 
The present study on lack of communications interoperability was guided by two 
research questions: (a) How do first responders describe their experiences in emergency 
situations that involve lack of communication interoperability? and (b) What is the role of 
budget and training in connection with communication interoperability and the policies 
that might be instituted to improve the safety of emergency responders? This section will 
be organized by research question. 
Research Question 1 
Research Question 1 addressed the overall issues involving lack of 
communications interoperability, especially via radio. The interview data from the 18 
participants from three states, two different kinds of agencies, and three different types of 
location (large city, small town, and rural areas) addressed the lack of communications 
interoperability throughout all the categories that were emphasized in research question 2. 
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As the first responders went through their daily routines as well as major natural, 
criminal, and political emergencies, they encountered many obstacles stemming from 
budgetary, policy, and training issues that hampered their ability to execute their duties to 
serve and protect the public.  
The radio equipment itself was probably the biggest challenge in lack of 
communication interoperability. There is a two-pronged problem in the equipment. Either 
the equipment was outdated and failed to function well or be used easily with other 
agencies in the case of an emergency where the responders are working together, or the 
equipment was new and the responders did not understand well enough how to operate it. 
For example, P2 believed he had sufficient training on radio operability, but he noted, 
“Each time we switch radio equipment, the sheer number of buttons on my radio can get 
confusing if you hit the wrong one.” He added that “the newer equipment has become 
more digitized or synthesized; therefore, increasing its capabilities 10 fold or more." P11 
discussed the delays caused by having to report a “man with a gun to the FD dispatch 
who then had to use radio channels to call the PD dispatch.” By the time they were done 
with the delays in this system, the man had escaped. In addition, equipment can fail. P15, 
a small-town law enforcement officer reported, “More than 1 occasion, I have had issues 
with my portable radio. Not holding a proper charge and dying in the middle stressful 
situation”. 
Even with the national system some participants discussed as a solution, many felt 
that the local jurisdictions would still need their own channels to avoid so much crowding 
of signals that information would be lost. P10 complained of not having “enough 
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equipment or people had different types of equipment to relay information.” P10 worked 
in another major city in California and saw the same issues. He complained that there 
were times he had to use his “own cell phone and there have been times when [he had] 
used the cell phones of others on scene to contact other officers or agencies for 
equipment.” Rural officers can have deeper problems than those in small towns and big 
cities that can generally rely on cell phone coverage. The former struggle with both 
outdated equipment and not being able to call on their phones due to the many dead areas 
that exist in a terrain that consists of  large mass of land and divided population. Even in 
a small town or in a big city, however, there are dead spots in buildings and alleys that 
can prohibit communication interoperability. 
Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 addressed the triple threat of the role that budget and training 
play in lack of communications interoperability and the policies that might be instituted 
to improve the safety of first responders. It also asked what policies might work to 
improve first responder safety. Of the responses from the 18 participants, budget was 
mentioned 29 times, policy 35 times, and training 49 times. Many of the miscellaneous 
issues mentioned 51 times included issues with equipment related to the first research 
question, but comments on how budget, policy, and training interplayed with equipment 
challenges were also brought up in the miscellaneous category. 
Many of the problems regarding lack of communications interoperability were 
related to money. Even though the agencies had different types of budgets from taxes or 
government grants, equipment was not always prioritized, and when it was, there was 
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generally inadequate training on it. While some participants thought their equipment 
worked well for them, most believed that budget played a role, particularly in small 
towns and rural areas because they have a lack of money in areas with low tax bases. P9 
in a small town law enforcement agency said that “unfortunately this is often a monetary 
issue which our small-town agency cannot afford better equipment”. 
Even in the big cities monetary problems arise that “drain the resources, and basic 
needs such as communication suffer...but who is ultimately going to pay for this?” 
according to P10, a law enforcement officer in a large city in California. She added that 
there was one time that they [her department] “requested for more radio equipment, but a 
few days after that, other situations arose and some of our secondary communication 
forms were taken back and used in other breaking incidents.” 
Training, as mentioned, was the topic discussed with the most frequency. A few 
participants were happy with their level of training. P10, the city law enforcement officer 
said that she felt she was adequately trained on the equipment. P16, the firefighter from a 
small town in California also felt adequately trained on the equipment and that they had 
“training and we have follow-up professional development.” Although it was noted that 
P12 did feel adequately trained, however. This big city firefighter acknowledged that 
though properly trained, when he arrived on the scene, he “knew more assistance would 
be needed...we were all required to complete training on the equipment; however, this 
equipment only works for those within my department.” He added, “No one else within 
the state has this type of radio communication equipment.” While it’s advantageous to 
have the latest technologies, if no one else can communicate with you on it, it becomes 
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useless as the previously used archaic radio communications systems that was replaced. 
So, essentially, it becomes trading one ineffective piece of equipment with a new piece of 
ineffective equipment.  
Many of the participants complained that they needed more classroom training 
rather than training on the job. Although on-the-job training has its benefits, an 
emergency that can threaten injury and death is hardly a time to learn a new skill. Still, 
P15 advocated for mock drills, which are entirely different and would provide much 
needed training. This small-town law enforcement officer said, “At my level, and my 
peers, we are provided training, however, we are limited by the capabilities of our radios 
which means, I can work my own radio, and I believe I know who I can talk to.” Thus, he 
recommended that "this whole situation can be improved by having a mock-drill and 
scenario-based training, which could help this.” 
P2, a big-city law enforcement officer, the one who complained about the 
confusing updated equipment, emphasized more visual, creative training: “I believe our 
agency the equipment is adequate, but again you need to have a flow chart to understand 
who you can talk to when and where…it’s very confusing if you’re not experienced with 
it." He noted a time when "the situation I experienced was because my radio switched to 
a different bank/frequency and I was not aware of it." Lack of training can have tragic 
results and some of the participants emphasized the importance of being well-trained to 
avoid dangerous situations and liability issues. The participants agreed that when new 




Good policies can help to address almost all lack of communications 
interoperability issues. Many participants mentioned having a national communications 
policy, but that would not be without its own problems. They still felt a need to have 
local channels open and coordinated training. P1, a small-town firefighter in New York 
stated, “A national system would be great, but budget and affordability would place a 
huge role in the ability to make that happen. Also, you would have to provide the same 
training across the board to everyone." P11, a firefighter from a rural area emphasized, “I 
do not believe it will work as there is too much traffic on single agency channels as it is. 
The increase in traffic would be too large and no communications can be effective in that 
way.” She explained, “There is too much traffic on local channels as it is now. So a 
national system would lead to added confusion and be counter-productive." 
Participants complained about the lack of coordination among agencies during 
disasters. P18 noted the following: 
Our policy is sufficient for our agency and operations. But, I believe that this 
issue involves other agencies as well (how we interact, how we keep channels 
current, how we keep access to each other, etc.) and since each agency has its own 
unique policy, little headway can be made unless these policies are coordinated, 
especially when it comes to encryption.   
Two other policies were related to vehicle equipment as being inadequate and the 
need to use plain talk rather than 10-code signals. P5, a firefighter in a large city 
complained about policy related to equipment and how it “varies from position to 
position.” He added that the Battalion Chiefs have repeaters in their vehicles but no one 
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else does so radio use varies depending on the type of call.” The plain talk issue was 
conveyed by P15, a small-town law enforcement officer who dealt with language issues 
in his jurisdiction: “I think [this policy can be improved by using plain talk as a policy 
instead of the ten-code and signals we use. There aren’t any more stressful situations than 
not knowing whether or not backup is coming or if anyone heard your call for help." 
Evidence of Trustworthiness 
Credibility 
In order to enhance credibility, I shared the transcribed interviews with the 
participants to confirm the accuracy of their words and individual perceptions. None of 
the participants objected to anything in the transcriptions. Answers were sufficiently 
detailed to not ask further probing questions, for all of the participants had shared that 
they were motivated to share their experiences with lack of radio interoperability toward 
the need to communicate during disasters and routine emergencies where lives may be at 
stake.  
Transferability 
The external validity of the study, or transferability, was established when rich 
descriptions were shared about the participants’ experience regarding lack of 
communication interoperability during emergencies. To seek variation in participant 
selection, I selected participants not only from the three most populous states in the 
United States, but they were also split evenly between firefighters and law enforcement 
personnel in three different settings consistent across the state. The settings were urban, 
rural, and small town fire and law enforcement agencies.  
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Dependability and Confirmability 
The reflexive analytical strategy that I used aided dependability and 
confirmability because I was engaged in listening to intonation and pauses during the 
telephone interviews and making observations of body language in the face to face 
interviews. During all of the telephone and face-to-face interviews, I took notes by hand 
in a journal to also track daily activities and methods along with bracketing to minimize 
bias (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). In the journal, I jotted down any thoughts, ideas, or 
attitudes I encountered during the telephonic and face-to-face interviews. 
Summary 
Using a wide variety of participants in two forms of first response from three 
different regions of the United States and in cities, small towns and rural areas provided a 
surprising uniformity in response. For the first research question, the participants 
uniformly agreed that lack of communications operability, especially via the radio was a 
barrier in serving and protecting the public. Moreover, few were satisfied with their 
budgets. Even the ones who felt their training was adequate knew that it did not extend to 
emergency situations where coordination of different agencies is key. All of the 
participants had suggestions for policies that can improve the way they carry out their 
jobs. Chapter 5 presents the connection of the findings to the literature as well as the 
conclusions and recommendations for this study.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
The purpose of this basic qualitative study was to explore ways, as reported by 
first responders, to effectively ensure their safety on reliable emergency communications, 
primarily through radio (either directly or via a network). The study was based on the 
premise that such reliable, fail-safe communications interoperability depends on training, 
budget, and policy. The qualitative research method employed was a basic qualitative 
study where the participants recounted their lived experiences regarding lack of radio 
interoperability when property and lives were at stake as well as the role of policy, 
training, and budget in connection with such interoperability. Specifically, the study 
involved semistructured interviews conducted with firefighters and law enforcement 
officers from California, New York, and Texas. These first responders, who had between 
10 and 30 years in their professional roles, presented first-hand depictions of the kinds of 
dangers with which they were faced in overcoming a condition of failed communications 
interoperability during natural or human-made disasters.  
Although the participants were drawn from both firefighting and law 
enforcement, and they came from three large states on opposite coasts and on the border 
of Mexico, their responses were mostly uniform. Together, they agreed that lack of 
communications operability, particularly via the radio, was a barrier in serving and 
protecting the public. Most first responders reported that their budgets and their training 
were inadequate and those who did believe the latter were enough, it rarely extended to 




Interpretation of Findings 
The literature gap is in lack of communication interoperability during mass crises 
involving catastrophic events like wildfires and floods and drought as well as lawlessness 
and acts of terror involving humans (National Centers for Environmental Information, 
2016). The literature on this issue is scant and those that address communication crises 
during a disaster when multiple agencies are called in to work together during natural 
disasters and human crises are almost nonexistent, particularly regarding radio 
interoperability. There are almost no academic studies on lack of radio interoperability as 
such (directly addressing lack of radio interoperability in a disaster) other than Huyck 
(2013, 2014) and professional literature (Timmons, 2007).  
More studies have been published on difficulties in communication in 
emergencies and the findings do corroborate with the general concept of challenges 
arising from lack of communication interoperability found all over the world (e.g., Fabac 
et al., 2013; Fu et al., 2012; Klappa et al., 2013; Simon et al., 2014). After an exhaustive 
literature search, no studies encompassed not only the lack of communications 
interoperability but its ties to budget, public policy, and training. Therefore, this study 
can fill a gap in the literature and contribute to positive social change in which public 
policies that promote adequate budgets and comprehensive training can help to ensure 
seamless communications interoperability to prevent personal injuries and fatalities in the 
line of duty. 
Overall, the findings not only confirmed the challenges of maintaining radio 
interoperability but also extended the knowledge and experience that first responders 
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have over many years of experience. All 18 of the participants found problems in 
communicating, whether in large buildings in urban areas (P1, a New York firefighter 
with experience in other locations complained about how building construction can 
hamper interoperability among first responders); in rural areas (P13, a law enforcement 
officer in rural Texas noted that despite the many repeater systems they need in the 
country, there are places that simply have no coverage even for cellphone backup if 
radios cannot communicate); or in small towns (P9, a small town California law 
enforcement officer complained that even with good equipment, the signal is simply not 
strong enough at all times). 
After the research was conducted and the findings revealed, I did a thorough 
search for articles that have come out in the past 5 years that may have been overlooked 
by varying combinations of original search terms for lack of radio or communication 
interoperability. Fourteen new peer-reviewed studies were located in a broad emergency 
management category. However, only three touched on the topic of interoperability 
(Cantwell & McDermott, 2016; Nelson, 2014; Nowell & Steelman, 2015). The other 
studies were mostly based on equipment and training, particularly looking toward the 
future: robotic deployment for disasters (Min, Kim, Lee, Jung, & Matson, 2016); 
alternatives for radios including expanded use of social media (Murphy, 2013); a system 
of aircraft piloted remotely for major disasters (Abrahamsen, 2015); mobile government 
services (Aloudat, Michael, Chen, & Al-Debei, 2014); interoperability during disaster 
recovery (Minh, Shibata, Borcea, & Yamada, 2016); and amateur radio operators helping 
to expand communication options (Nollet & Ohto, 2013).  
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Lack of communication interoperability permeated the themes and how budget, 
training, and policy affected the participants’ experiences when they could not 
communicate with other jurisdictions during a crisis. The subthemes that arose directly 
from lack of interoperability are (a) lack of communication interoperability costs lives, 
(b) poor radio transmission due to variations in equipment, (c) having to result to 
personal and others’ cellphones, d) difficulty communicating in large buildings, (e) 
dependency on own dispatch in lieu of interoperability with other agencies, and (f) large 
land mass in rural areas with sporadic coverage. 
The triple threat of budget and training and the policies that govern these critical 
areas of communication were confirmed by almost all of the participants. Regarding 
budget, many of the problems within interoperability stem from not having the funding to 
buy sufficient or updated equipment often as a result of improperly allocated or 
inadequate budgets. Huyck (2015) emphasized that if technological networks are 
expanded, it takes more than training and policy but also adequate budgets to cover the 
unfunded state and federal mandates. Larger organizations have more funding compared 
to smaller agencies (citation), yet more funding does not necessarily lead to having state-
of-the-art equipment, especially when situations emerge where the money has to be 
reallocated. Subthemes that could be connected to budget were (a) equipment update 
delays due to emergency budget priorities and (b) lack of money in small towns and rural 
areas. P8, a firefighter from a small town in Texas, brought up both subthemes when he 
acknowledged that while nonurban areas do get grants from the government for 
equipment, the money often ends up being prioritized for vehicles and other fire 
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equipment. Though they are aware of more advanced systems, money rarely goes for 
radio equipment. Further, their grants get smaller every year. 
P16, a small town firefighter in California noted that his work is done off a radio 
system that the department has used for 4 years, and he knows about other systems that 
could serve their needs better but he had no knowledge of when a new system “will be 
allotted to [them].” He felt that there was no communication from his superiors if and 
when they would be obtaining new equipment and did not know if they even had the 
“financial resources to move ahead with a new radio system or other types of 
equipment.” Even when there is adequate money budgeted for new equipment, there can 
be problems. P12, for example, an urban California firefighter, complained that despite 
the fact he and his colleagues were trained on the new system, they had no idea about its 
nature, they were not able to choose a new system themselves, and importantly, they had 
no knowledge if anyone else in the state had the same equipment, which corroborates the 
problem of lack of radio interoperability because there were no uniform equipment 
standards. Thus, during a disaster, they would not be able to rely on being able to 
communicate with other teams. 
Though some first responders were satisfied with their equipment, they feel they 
“would have been better prepared if [they] had direct communications with the other fire 
department that was already on the scene” (P14, rural California firefighter). P14 did feel 
confident their equipment was adequate for them but cautioned, “What we need is a 
system that works with other fire departments within our state … I’d like to know if we 
have the financial resources to obtain equipment that talks with other fire departments in 
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state.” P15, a small town law enforcement officer in Texas has had good experiences with 
their “relatively dated equipment” but speculated that “if a major incident ever did 
occur,” they would not “be able to communicate with mutual aid assistance from other 
jurisdictions with newer equipment and on different frequencies.” Furthermore, P13, a 
rural Texas law enforcement officer related that what stood out the most regarding lack of 
communication interoperability was that he “can’t safely serve because of the 
communication interoperability,” which relates not only to budget but also to public 
policy. 
Policy subthemes, either regarding local rules and procedures, between agencies, 
or from government either actual or as suggestions arose four times: (a) lack of 
coordination among agencies, (b) desire for national communication system, (c) vehicle 
radio equipment inadequate in emergencies, and (d) need for plain talk instead of 10-code 
and signals. Many of the participants criticized the ineffectual or misapplied governing 
policies. Policies have been made that first responders should go through the IPAWS 
process established by FEMA in 2004 with the goal of interoperability between different 
kinds of responders toward the goals of safety and security (Goldstein, 2013; Leiva, 
2014).  
However, the GAO (2009) revealed that progress was slow in implementing 
public policy. P13 saw policy as a safety factor which “creates added danger to an 
already dangerous situation and backup may be further away than I would need and like.” 
He added that areas that have no coverage are discovered on the job, which tends to make 
first responders do their “best to say out of those areas for safety reasons” (P13). Baldini 
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et al. (2013) touted a technology of wireless communication that should work for every 
agency: the military, corporations, and public safety. Yet, the researchers noted that 
policies have to be enforced to allocate the resources including who can access the 
technology and what resources are available and when and where and how to apply the 
technology. Baldini et al.’s framework involved negotiating trust so that distributed 
access policies have to have multiple parties ensuring the access. 
Training, or its lack, was discussed by all of the participants. Regarding the 
frequency with which this topic came up, often in depth, there were 29 mentions of 
budget, 35 of policy, and 49 of training. Four subthemes arose on training: (a) classroom 
training needs rather than on-the-job training, (b) lack of training can result in liability 
issues, (c) lack of training can result in injuries and loss of life, and (d) need for 
coordination of training with new equipment and policies. Henry (2009) brought up five 
challenges regarding training, some of which are strongly related to policy: (a) oversight 
and governance (informal), (b) uncoordinated standard operating procedures, (c) 
incompatible and obsolete technology, (d) infrequent and inconsistent trainings and 
exercises, and (e) difficulty integrating interoperability into routine, daily use. The 
participants brought up each of these challenges in their interview. Although some of the 
first responders were satisfied with the training they had received, most of them 
complained about inadequate training. In the case, for example, of those whose 
departments had purchased new equipment, few felt adequately trained. 
As stated previously, for successful communication interoperability, shared 
management, control, policies, and procedures must be multidisciplinary and 
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multijurisdictional. There is a significant gap in the literature on lack of radio 
interoperability. In the scholarly literature, only Huyck (2015) addressed the general 
problem in the past 10 years. Huyct (2013) also presented a case study involving public 
safety radio interoperability in a populated county in Illinois. Huyck (2015) emphasized 
the importance of restructuring policies and legislation as a result of inadequate federal 
funding, stating, “As it stands, interoperability problems cross-organizationally and 
jurisdictionally are inherent within the current structure of radio communication among 
first responders” (p. 22). The literature that Huyck cited is primarily from the GAO and 
professional publications, but of the articles cited, all recommend more cooperation 
among agencies. Because the systems cannot communicate compatibly, stronger policies 
need to be made. Huyck noted that “technological limitations of equipment hardware and 
cost deliberations over added infrastructure … illuminated operational barriers to the 
achievement of long-term radio interoperability” (p. 22), a finding that is consistent with 
the results of the present study. Public policies must be made so that lack of radio 
interoperability for local agencies will be solved and the necessary resources can be 
funded (Huyck, 2015). 
The conceptual framework of the study was based on three communication 
theories: Grebner’s general model of communication theory; Shannon and Weaver’s 
information theory; and risk communication theory. The findings of the study tied in well 
with these theories. The main focus of Grebner (1956) was not only on the dynamism of 
communication but also how it would only be effective if its use involved a consistent 
method. Grebner noted that the factors that come into play during an event (E) related to 
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the message (M) are context, selection, and availability all of which are present in 
emergency management. Consistent communication interoperability during the context of 
a wildfire, for instance, involves selecting a means for one firefighter to be able to talk to 
another firefighter or another team who may not have the same equipment or channels 
available to warn them that the wind has changed direction and their lives are in danger. 
The dimension of means and controls, according to Grebner, necessitates communication 
with a third party over which the control can vary depending on capability. The message, 
as in the case of the wildfire, can be complicated through incompatible receivers. Thus, 
the message may be complicated and lack of interoperability takes over. At every level, 
communication can be changed or altered (Grebner, 1956). 
Shannon and Weaver’s work on communication theory involved interpreting 
human communication (Griffen, 2014). Like the first responders whose main goal was 
always full communication interoperability, Shannon and Weaver (year) demonstrated 
through the communications interpretations, that the most important goal is to reduce loss 
of information. They first theorized about noise, which can disrupt communication flow 
to the point that the one who should receive the intended message cannot. The stakes are 
much higher in emergency management; contrary to noise causing problems in everyday 
communication, property damage, injury, and death can be the result of lack of 
communication interoperability. Similarly, in risk communication theory, where 
originally, Fischhoff (1995) discussed managers communicating events involving risks to 
the public, the theory is now used widely in emergency management for all those in 
charge of risk control. Coombs (2012) emphasized that failure to control risk effectively 
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may either lead to a crisis or go the opposite way where a crisis may lead to necessary 
risk communication, both of which are the main areas that the present study addresses.  
Lack of consistency was one of the main problems for all 18 respondents. There 
were inconsistent budgetary resources; inconsistent, inadequate training even when the 
responders asked for even the most basic information or more information on operating 
their equipment; and inconsistent policies from one agency to the other, one state to the 
other, and from lack of implementation of federal policies. Finally, as stated previously, 
equipment and training would not be problems if adequate funding, proper budgetary 
items, and consistent policies were allocated to provide first responders with the life-
saving tools they need. 
Limitations of the Study 
The study participants were limited to first responders who were firefighters and 
law enforcement officers who had experienced emergency situations in the populous 
states of California, New York, and Texas. One limitation of the study is that the research 
was confined to only fighters and law enforcement officers among other emergency 
responders such as paramedics and other medical personnel. Another limitation is the 
participants were chosen from three of 47 other U.S. states, yet by spreading the states 
over a wide geographical range, the limitation was somewhat addressed. A third 
limitation was that the participants were kept to 18, so my representative sample was 
small but manageable based on the themes. Still, keeping to the three most populous 
states gave a higher instance of issues than might have arisen for other regions. The 
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results from this basic qualitative study could not be generalized to all first responders in 
all states who have experienced emergencies of disastrous proportions. 
It is important to note that two disciplines were used where a lot of similarities 
and differences between disciplines could be seen and kept the study from getting 
unwieldy. Because I was unable to go out in the field, I did not have the opportunity to 
interview face-to-face in two out of three states, but based on the results, the findings 
were consistent despite the means through which the data were gathered. One clear 
limitation was that not all departments had the same budgets and were not pulling the 
funding from the same sources. Small town fight fighters, for instance, had less of a 
budget than that of a larger agency. Another possible limitation was the criterion of 
survey participants having to have had at least 10 years of experience in the discipline, 
which precluded participants who could have added to the study even though they had 
less experience.  
Recommendations 
The recommendations for this study are based upon the literature search 
conducted, the data collected, and the results analyzed, all of which suggest global 
challenges in addressing lack of radio interoperability. The following recommendations 
are by no means all inclusive, but rather are within the depth and scope of the parameters 
of the present study.  
Budgets are predetermined by those who dictate policy and allocate funds. Unless 
there is a dedicated grant writer on staff, funding becomes challenging because it is so 
difficult to process because of bureaucratic red tape. Time to find financial resources to 
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further support the initial budget is also limited. Whoever is in involved in budget must 
understand the process and objectives. If one does not have sufficient knowledge of the 
recommended or needed equipment, not only will the wrong equipment be purchased but 
it might not serve the needs of the agency. Therefore, though hiring a grant writer might 
seem cost-prohibitive in the short term, it is a financially sound decision in the long term. 
The equipment would have incompatibilities and possibly not be expandable. If grant 
writers are not available and funds are limited for big-ticket items or upgrading present 
systems, then the agency can consider various patches to serve as an intermediate means 
to expand communications interoperability.  
Agencies must consider other agencies within surrounding jurisdictions so 
upgrades are compatible and those who use the equipment can become more 
knowledgeable and adaptable for future implementation of the equipment. Decisions 
cannot be made in isolation but rather collaboratively through the use of MOAs and 
MOUs. Not only is communication critical among agencies for the short term, but also 
collegial strategic planning is essential for the long-term health and viability of the 
organization and ultimately the community. 
Although several participants mentioned the need for a national network, many 
agencies are unable to comply because of attitudes, cultures, and beliefs in addition to 
outdated or incompatible equipment. Further, the impracticality of putting so many first 
responders on one national network is an important consideration regarding 
overcrowding and security (e.g., how many people can get on a channel at one time). The 
statewide patch capabilities and knowing who one can be communicated with are more 
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understood within a jurisdiction through trial and error and history. Communication is 
supposed flow to the federal level, but there is training and policy disconnect. Certain 
federal agencies have capabilities for interoperability but only among themselves. 
Communication interoperability is also rooted in technological advances; thus, for 
communication to occur, agencies need to keep up continuously with technology. The 
National Association of State Telecommunications Directors, the Association of Public 
Safety Communication Officials in addition to various federal agencies developed P25 as 
a universal standard for public safety personnel to ensure compatibility. However, the 
standards have been significantly vague to the point that manufacturers have not been 
able to produce sufficiently compatible equipment. Furthermore, compatibility comes 
with price, which results in agencies having aging, incompatible equipment that fails to 
lead to interoperability (GAO-07-301, 2007). Therefore, administrators need to be 
mindful and share ongoing communications with their team to be cognizant of what is 
happening in regards to the policy. It is apparent that P25 needs to be expanded to include 
specific language that defies ambiguity. 
On September 11, 2001 during the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, 
the NYPD repeaters were on the top of one of the two buildings. Thus, system 
redundancy is needed in the case of a major system going down to keep interoperability. 
A policy has already been established in the National Interoperability Field Operations 
Guide (NIFOG) from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Emergency 
Communications (2011). Personnel who are tasked with programming and maintaining 
communications equipment for their organization should be given this guide as a means 
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to program the channels for federal communications interoperability. The stipulation is 
that it cannot be used for anything other than federal communications. A federal agency 
must be involved. However, the guide points to multiple bandwidth accessibility for 
nonfederal interoperability channels. It is recommended that those in administrative or 
training role be given this guide to communicate appropriate functions to those in the 
day-to-day practices of emergency management. As stated in the manual,  
The NIFOG may be used by radio technicians when programming channels in 
radios. We recommend having these channels programmed in radios at all times, 
as permitted by the applicability regulations, rather than waiting until a disaster is 
imminent or occurring to do the programming. (p. 3) 
The DHS claims that the NIFOG is an appropriate tool to be used by emergency 
communications planners so they will have enough information on channels of 
interoperability to know what they will encounter in the radios of their colleagues from 
other jurisdictions or disciplines. Because the allocation of radio waves defines a small 
segment of bandwidth, bandwidths are split (bandwidth frequency allocations). Certain 
needs for various locations are situation specific and; therefore, must be determined as 
part of policy, even within a given state. 
Implications  
The adage about a parent having to put his/her oxygen mask on before assisting 
the child’s oxygen mask in an emergency also applies to first responders. Best practice 
teaches first responders that they come first, then the victims, and finally the suspects. 
Personal preparedness is key to managing an emergency. When firefighters and law 
123 
 
enforcement officers have needed radio interoperability, they have fewer barriers in 
fulfilling their duties in protecting the people they serve than if radio interoperability is 
lacking. 
The implication for social change within an organization is increased productivity 
as well as the ability to communicate with other agencies so that each entity can carry out 
their purpose efficiency. 
The implications for social change for society are that shared digital trunked 
systems increase interoperability and expand coverage for greater flexibility among users. 
Providing that various agencies are in alignment with one another, standards are 
improved and compliance issues are minimized. 
The community can perpetuate social change once awareness is established. 
Without communication of budgetary needs, for example, negative consequences can 
result for local agencies. Community awareness and involvement can lead to both short-
term help and long-term solutions. 
In searching for patch capabilities, it is cost effective to utilize these options as 
opposed to alienating current systems in exchange for cutting edge technology that may 
not be compatible or in alignment with nearby jurisdictions. Although patching may seem 
like too simple a solution, such an alternative may provide the short-term assistance that 
is crucially needed for organizational success. Because much of the new equipment is 
digital, it might be expanded at a later date to other bands.  
When policies are delineated among jurisdictions, the benefits for future 
interoperability are improved. Once the policies are transparent, they let agencies 
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understand the intentions are of obtaining and maintaining communications systems, and 
there can be more standardization among jurisdictions.  
Policies on state and national levels can provide greater articulation so that 
everyone will be in better alignment. In interoperability, prevention is positive. It keeps 
everyone in alignment in preparation for a response.  
If the grant process is continued, then everyone needs to be aware of how 
interoperability can be coordinated for proper response. Local agencies are often reluctant 
to share their frequency lineups for compatibility reasons. Thus, people are unaware of 
this issue (“You cannot talk to everybody you want to?”). This study can help raise 
community awareness to promote the objectives of communication interoperability. 
Conclusions 
This study confirmed the need for those in the emergency services field to have a 
finite, transparent, and consistent policy regarding communication interoperability for 
personnel to effectively save lives without compromising their own personal safety in the 
process. The indices of budget, policy, and training demonstrated a marked outcome in 
carrying out this study of the experience of first responders in addressing lack of 
communication interoperability. 
While there is almost always the need for more money across agencies to fund 
compatible radio equipment, grant writers can be obtained to seek and apply for 
additional funds as needed. Additionally, should a grant writer not be a viable option, 
then the specific organization can make outreach to the community in an attempt to 
further promote their cause. Policy needs to be consistently managed through assessment 
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and updates, to be revisited, to ensure it is meeting the needs of the agency, of the user 
and of the community that it serves. Even though training is required, whether it is 
through formal instruction or on-the-job experience, consistent, ongoing training is vital 
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